Utah Law Review
Volume 2016 | Number 1

Article 3

2016

When Local Government Misbehaves
Shelley Ross Saxer

Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Saxer, Shelley Ross (2016) "When Local Government Misbehaves," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2016 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2016/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

WHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT MISBEHAVES
Shelley Ross Saxer*
Abstract
This Article addresses one of the lingering questions following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District. In that land use case, the Court held that proposed
local government monetary exactions from property owners to permit
land development were subject to the same heightened scrutiny test as
imposed physical exactions. The Court left unanswered the question of
how broadly this heightened scrutiny should be applied to other monetary
obligations imposed by the government. The Article argues that “in-lieu”
exactions that are individually assessed as part of the permitting process
should be treated differently than the impact fees that are developed
through the legislative process and are applied equally to all developers
without regard to a specific project. Accordingly, Koontz’s application
should be limited to “the special context of land-use exactions” during a
permitting process rather than be extended to all regulatory monetary
obligations.
The Article begins by identifying the various levels of scrutiny
applied to land use decisions and shows how these levels are designed to
prevent the abuse of power, particularly when actions are exercised at
the individualized level. It concludes by suggesting that exactions that
result in a permanent physical occupation of real property should be
subject to heightened scrutiny. However, only administrative,
individualized, monetary exactions, designed to replace a physical
exaction, such as the kind involved in Koontz, should be subject to
heightened scrutiny to control the potential for abuse. Legislatively
determined monetary conditions such as impact fees, but not taxes,
should be subject to review under state statutory or judicial standards,
which range from a rational basis test to more stringent tests, such as the
dual rational nexus test or the Nollan/Dolan test. In the absence of a state
standard of review, legislatively enacted impact fees challenged in
federal court should be analyzed under the deferential rational basis test
for land use regulation.
* © 2016 Shelley Ross Saxer. Vice Dean and Laure Sudreau-Rippe Chair in Law,
Pepperdine University School of Law. I am grateful for the opportunity to present this paper
at the Takings Litigation Conference in 2014, the ALPS Conference in 2014, and at Syracuse
University School of Law in 2013. Thank you to Dana Berliner, David Callies, Steven Eagle,
John Echeverria, and my colleague, Bob Pushaw, for the excellent comments and criticism.
I am also grateful for the editing assistance of Melissa Ardo, Corey Baker, and Mark
Montgomery. Any errors or omissions are mine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Local officials may abuse their power over land-use regulation, particularly
when they are involved in individualized decision-making over discrete landowners
and parcels. A city council’s legislative actions are subject to public hearings and
are generally directed to resolving issues affecting the community as a whole. But
when individual decision making is involved, there is considerable concern about
self-dealing, special interests, and the potential for abuse of power. 1 The
jurisprudence of land-use regulation addresses this concern by applying differing
levels of judicial scrutiny to government actions. In challenges to land-use
regulation, courts more closely scrutinize those situations where government abuse
is most likely to appear.
The threat of abuse is most acute when the government requires from property
owners an exaction, which is a burden—either physical, such as a public easement,
or monetary—placed on a project as a condition of development approval.2 The U.S.
Supreme Court “has usually been deferential to state courts and local
decisionmaking on land use” except in exaction cases, 3 most notably Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission4 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.5 These two decisions
established a heightened scrutiny test for physical exactions demanded by
government officials to offset the perceived negative impacts from landowners
seeking development permits in an adjudicatory process.6 The test requires that there
be an essential nexus and proportionality between the exaction and the negative
impact caused by the proposed development.7
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 8 the Court
unanimously held that the Nollan/Dolan test, which had been developed in the
context of imposed exactions, also applies to proposed exactions.9 A majority of
Justices then ruled that Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny that applies to physical
1
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, From Nectow to Koontz: The Supreme Court’s Supervision of
Land-Use Regulation, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 22 (July 25, 2014)
(discussing one theory for closer judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions that “parties
who lose from an administrative decision have fewer political roads to correct them than they
do in legislative matters”).
2
Id. at 19.
3
Id. at 1 (noting that this deference is “appropriate given the Court’s lack of access to
local knowledge”).
4
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
6
In Nollan, the exaction at issue was a lateral public easement along the landowner’s
beachfront lot, whereas the city planning commission in Dolan required an easement
dedicated for a public greenway. In both cases the Court applied heightened scrutiny to such
“physical” exactions. See supra note 4, at 825 and note 5, at 379–80.
7
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development.”).
8
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
9
Id. at 2599.

2016]

WHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT MISBEHAVES

107

exactions should also be applied to monetary exactions that are demanded in lieu of
physical property.10 Justice Alito began the majority’s opinion by stating that the
Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan “provide important protection against the
misuse of the power of land-use regulation.”11
The Court could have identified alternative constitutional bases for challenges
to monetary conditions. One would be a substantive due process claim based on
unfairness and governed by the deferential rational basis standard. Another would
be a takings challenge to a severe and disproportionate monetary imposition,
evaluated under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York12 standard.
This standard requires courts to balance three factors, including the severity of the
impact of the monetary demand, the interference with investment-backed
expectations of the landowner, and the character of the government action.13 For
example, in an earlier challenge to a monetary imposition, a plurality of the Court
applied the Penn Central factors in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel14 to find that the
Coal Act’s imposition of severe and disproportionate retroactive liability constituted
a taking.15 However, instead of applying either a substantive due process analysis or
the Penn Central factors to the monetary exaction challenged in Koontz, the Court
determined that the Nollan/Dolan test provided the appropriate scrutiny.16 Nollan
and Dolan were deemed to be the applicable decisions because the “direct link
between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property” required
scrutiny to address “the risk that the government may use its substantial power and
discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential
nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific
property.”17
This Article will address the Koontz majority’s holding—subjecting in-lieu
monetary exactions to the heightened scrutiny test of Nollan/Dolan18—and argue
10
Id. at 2602 (noting that “respondent has maintained throughout this litigation that it
considered petitioner’s money to be a substitute for his deeding to the public a conservation
easement on a larger parcel of undeveloped land”).
11
Id. at 2591.
12
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
13
Id. at 124.
14
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
15
Id. at 529–37. It should be noted that Justice Kennedy, who concurred with the
judgment for Eastern Enterprises, dissented from the takings holding, noting that for
regulatory takings challenges there must be “a specific property right or interest . . . at stake.”
Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring with the
plurality that the Coal Act’s application to Eastern violates due process because of the
retroactive imposition of financial liability, but dissenting from plurality’s conclusion that
the statute violated the Takings Clause).
16
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
17
Id.
18
See Scott Woodward, The Remedy for a “Nollan/Dolan Unconstitutional Conditions
Violation,” 38 VT. L. REV. 701, 701 (2014) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions
violation and remedy).
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that this approach fits within the existing state and federal judicial framework used
to prevent land-use regulatory abuse. However, this Article will also argue that
legislatively determined impact fees are not monetary exactions and should not be
subject to Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny. Instead, impact fees should be
evaluated under existing state standards, which range from rational basis scrutiny to
more exacting review.
Much debate and scholarship has followed the Koontz decision.19 Some have
predicted that the consequences will be dire for local governments if the Court’s
holding is applied to any monetary fee demanded of developers and possibly to
environmental regulation as well.20 Justice Kagan’s dissent, which disagreed with
the majority’s extension of Nollan and Dolan to the payment or expenditure of
money in government permitting, expressed this concern by avowing that the
uncertainty of this rule “threatens to subject a vast array of land-use regulations,
applied daily in States and localities throughout the country, to heightened
constitutional scrutiny.”21 Others assert varying views including that 1) the Koontz
decision is a “big yawn” that will have little effect, particularly on environmental
regulation, which is already governed by environmental impact review; 22 2) the
Koontz majority was wrong to extend the Nollan/Dolan inquiry to monetary
exactions and instead should have recognized that the claim ultimately rests on
substantive due process that should be governed by the deferential rational basis
standard;23 3) similar to the impact of Nollan/Dolan, after Koontz, planners and local
officials will do a better job of “justifying and documenting the rationale for exacting
money or land from developers”; 24 4) Koontz created a per se taking when a
government attaches a monetary obligation to property that cannot be classified as a
tax;25 5) the Court’s Nollan/Dolan limitations on land-use negotiations “run counter
19

See, e.g., id. at 702 (“The Koontz decision leaves no doubt that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine will remain an integral part of takings law for the foreseeable future. But,
Koontz resurrects old questions and creates new ones.”).
20
See Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
287.
21
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
22
See J.B. Ruhl, Koontz: A Big Yawn for Environmental Law?, YOUTUBE (June 24,
2014), http://youtu.be/YbVxU-leFLo [http://perma.cc/K6PY-CJLJ]; see also Ronald H.
Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth
With Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 191, 262 (2006) (observing that the features of
environmental impact analysis have been applied to development exactions during the last
two decades and that “[t]he impact of the Nollan/Dolan case line appears to have been
confined to an extremely narrow set of circumstances—adjudicated or individuallynegotiated impact fees—and these cases do not commonly occur”).
23
See John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573, 585 (2015); see
also Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 20, at 352–55; Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process
by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L.
REV. 403, 403 (2014).
24
Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW. 1, 22–23
(2014) (quoting Professors Ann E. Carlson and Daniel Pollak).
25
Michael Castle Miller, The New Per Se Takings Rule: Koontz’s Implicit Revolution
of the Regulatory State, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 923 (2014).
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to the economic idea that takings jurisprudence makes governments face a higher
cost for regulation”; 26 and 6) the courts should differentiate between fees and
expenditures such that heightened scrutiny should apply to fees only where the
permit applicant is required to directly transfer money to the government, but not to
expenditures that “require a permit applicant to spend money to carry out mitigation
activities.” 27 This Article, with the support of others, 28 proposes that in-lieu
exactions that are individually assessed as part of the permitting process should be
treated differently than the impact fees that are developed through the legislative
process and applied equally to all developers without regard to the specific project.
The purpose in advocating this approach is not to arrive at a particular result,
either pro-government or pro-developer, but to determine what level of judicial
scrutiny should be applied to monetary impact fees consistent with the traditional
land-use regulation framework, based on both state law and U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. This Article does not propose a different approach to evaluating property
owners’ claims of excessive regulation. Instead, it works within the established
structure developed by the states and the Court up through the Koontz and Horne v.
Department of Agriculture29 decisions. While some from both sides of the property
rights issue have criticized the Court’s jurisprudence in land-use law, this Article
suggests that the general development of takings law has resulted in a well-reasoned
approach with one exception, which the Court has now corrected.30 This framework
26

FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 45.
Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131,
131 (2014); see also Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2605–
06 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority in E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498 (1998) distinguished “between the appropriation of a specific property interest and the
imposition of an order to pay money” and found that a statute requiring a company to pay
money for employee health benefits was not a taking, therefore “a requirement that a person
pay money to repair public wetlands is not a taking”). But see Town of Flower Mound v.
Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. 2004) (requiring “a developer [to]
improve an abutting street at its own expense is in no sense a use restriction” and should be
analyzed the same as an exaction in determining whether a taking has occurred).
28
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 259 (concluding that “[a]djudicative or discretionarily
imposed fees will be subjected to the full rigor of Nollan/Dolan analysis while legislative or
non-discretionary fees will undergo state constitutional review usually under a form of
rational nexus evaluation”); see also Echeverria, supra note 23, at 611 (noting that “there are
sound reasons for not extending the ruling in Koontz, which involved an ad hoc calculation
of charges, to fees determined through a formula set by statute”); Timothy M. Mulvaney,
Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2700954 [https://perma.cc/F6XN7QY] (finding the arguments for the legislative/adjudicative distinction persuasive, but
discussing the potential for the secondary effects that “actually impede the goals of
progressive property theory”).
29
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015) (noting that direct
appropriations of real property and personal property must be treated alike under the Fifth
Amendment).
30
See infra notes 70–80 and accompanying text. The first prong of the takings test
expressed in Agins was later repudiated by the Court in Lingle and held to be a substantive
due process challenge. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541–45 (2005).
27
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was adeptly presented by Justice O’Connor in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.31 and is
described in flow chart form in Appendix A, which also includes some thoughts as
to how the analysis of land use takings challenges should be approached. This
Article maintains that the Court should continue to operate within this framework
and limit the application of Koontz to “the special context of land-use exactions”32
rather than extend it to all government regulation as Justice Kagan’s dissent
portends. In addition, the development of takings law for personal property can
follow the land-use framework so long as it does not mistakenly use concepts
developed specifically for real property takings without taking into account the
context under which these concepts arose.33
The Article begins by identifying the various levels of scrutiny applied to landuse decisions and shows how these levels are designed to prevent the abuse of power,
particularly when actions are exercised at the individualized level. This consistent
framework supports treating ad hoc in-lieu exactions that require discretionary
permits differently than uniform monetary fees imposed legislatively. Part II
compares the scrutiny levels applied to land use actions such as: legislative versus
administrative actions; spot zoning challenges; consistency with the general plan;
impermissible delegation of legislative authority; initiative and referendum
authority; eminent domain challenges; and constitutional challenges, both facial and
as applied, to corroborate the theme that abuse of power is controlled through
increased judicial scrutiny when appropriate. Part III discusses the Koontz case and
explores existing state and federal laws that treat exactions differently than monetary
impact fees. Part IV briefly reviews expanded regulatory applications of impact fees,
such as affordable housing techniques, climate change fees, and efforts to address
environmental resilience and sustainability.
The Article concludes by suggesting that any physical or monetary in-lieu
exaction proposed as part of a land-use adjudicative permitting process constitutes
a permanent physical occupation (or an attempt to evade such an occupation through
payment of money) under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.34 and is,
therefore, a per se taking, unless it passes Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny.35 The
decision in Nollan, expanded by Dolan and Koontz, was based on making an
exception to the Loretto per se taking rule in situations involving land-use
permitting. Loretto involved a New York state law that required landlords to permit
the installation of television cable on their property. 36 The Court held that this
legislative action requiring a permanent physical occupation of private property
constituted a taking.37 The government action in Loretto did not involve a permitting
process, whereby permission could be refused, and the government alternatively
31

544 U.S. at 545–48.
Id. at 538.
33
See infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
34
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
35
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
36
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
37
Id. at 438.
32
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could condition the grant of the permit on the developer’s willingness to offset
negative externalities caused by the proposed development. Instead, the legislation
requiring a permanent physical occupation of a cable was a confiscation of real
property, albeit a minor one, because it “chop[ped] through the bundle [of property
rights], taking a slice of every strand.”38
Legislation or any other government action resulting in the confiscation of real
property, other than an exaction, would not be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny and
would instead constitute a per se taking if it caused a permanent physical occupation
of the property. Similarly, confiscations of personal property should constitute a per
se Fifth Amendment taking requiring just compensation, provided that the
government essentially possesses or occupies (and not merely regulates) the
property. 39 Regulations placed on personal property that are excessive can be
challenged as a taking and evaluated using the Penn Central factors.40
Exactions that result in a permanent physical occupation of real property should
be subject to Nollan/Dolan. However, only administrative, 41 individualized,
monetary exactions, designed to replace a physical exaction, such as the kind
involved in Koontz, should be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to control the
potential for abuse.42 Legislatively determined monetary obligations such as impact
fees, which are charges imposed on a development to offset the increased service

38

Id. at 435.
See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015) (noting that direct
appropriations of real property and personal property must be treated alike under the Fifth
Amendment); Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284–87 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding
that the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 (PRMPA), which
allowed the government to take possession and control of the Nixon papers constituted a per
se taking of Mr. Nixon’s personal property and required just compensation).
40
See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (holding that requiring Eastern to
pay “the expense of lifetime health benefits for miners based on its activities decades before
those benefits were promised” was a taking).
41
Judicial review of administrative decisions is stricter than review of decisions that
are legislative in nature. See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468
(7th Cir. 1988).
42
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013)
(citing Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (stating that “when the government
commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such
as a bank account or parcel of real property, a ‘per se [takings] approach’ is the proper mode
of analysis”)). For a very similar approach, see Colorado’s Regulatory Impairment of
Property Rights Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-201 to 29-20-205 (2008), which is
described and interpreted in Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d 875, 878–
79 (Colo. App. 2008) (explaining that the Act was enacted to codify federal and state
constitutional protections against regulatory takings like those in Nollan and Dolan and is
triggered only if 1) the action imposes conditions upon the grant of land use approval and 2)
either requires the landowner to dedicate real property “or pay money or provide services to
a public entity in an amount that is determined on an individual and discretionary basis”).
39

112

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

requirement,43 but not taxes, should be subject to review under state law standards,
which range from a reasonableness test to more stringent tests under statutory or
judicial determinations. A majority of states apply the dual rational nexus test to
impact fees. This test was developed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v.
Village of Menomonee Falls,44 and has been described as two steps: 1) there must
be a rational nexus “‘between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth
in population generated by the subdivision,’” and 2) a rational nexus “‘between the
expenditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.’”45
While this test may be similar to the Nollan/Dolan test, which requires that there be
an essential nexus and proportionality between the exaction requested and the
impact caused by the development sought, the dual rational nexus test requires that
the impact fee does not exceed the cost of the infrastructure required by the
development and that the development receives a benefit from the infrastructure.46
The dual rational nexus test is aimed at preventing the government from using
legislative fees instead of taxes, which it may not have the power to impose, to
support the community infrastructure by burdening only the newcomers without an
associated benefit to those being burdened. This test for impact fees seeks to ensure
that the money collected through legislative fees is actually spent to address the
impact on infrastructure allegedly caused by the development, instead of being
placed in a general revenue account. The Nollan/Dolan test was developed to
prevent the government from individually exacting physical or monetary
concessions from a developer during the permitting process and aims to prevent the
government from essentially extorting property from developers that is not related
to the development’s actual impact. While the difference between these tests may
not yield a different result, states should have the freedom to maintain the dual
rational nexus test or any other level of scrutiny they deem appropriate for reviewing
challenges to legislative action.
In the absence of a state standard of review, legislatively enacted impact fees
challenged in federal court should be analyzed under the traditional rational basis
test for land-use regulation.47 Even assuming that a legislatively enacted impact fee
can pass a deferential rational basis test or the dual rational nexus test, landowners
can still challenge these fees as legislation that has gone too far and assert a takings
challenge for evaluation under the Penn Central factors, which examine the severity
43

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 11-36a-102 (West 2012) (“‘Impact fee’ means a payment
of money imposed upon new development activity as a condition of development approval
to mitigate the impact of the new development on public infrastructure.”).
44
137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
45
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 225–26 (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty.,
431 So. 2d 606, 611–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the second prong of the test
will not be satisfied unless “the ordinance . . . specifically earmark[s] the funds collected for
use in acquiring capital facilities to benefit the new residents”)).
46
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 260.
47
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 37 (observing the resistance of federal courts to get
involved in litigating land use regulations because “the reasonableness of each party’s claims
is difficult to assess without local knowledge that is difficult to transmit to higher courts”).
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of the impact on the property owner, the interference with the owner’s investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the government action.48 Economically,
the regulatory impact on the property owner is the same, regardless of whether it is
a legislative or adjudicative action, and is subject to challenge as a regulatory taking.
However, applying heightened scrutiny to these actions, instead of a rational basis
review, is justified when there is a potential for government to misbehave. Accepting
the Supreme Court’s “attempt to supervise bargaining between regulators and
landowners in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz,”49 the decision by the Koontz majority to
subject monetary exactions to greater scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan is consistent with
the state courts’ historic struggle to police the exercise of discretion in the land-use
field.50 This Article distinguishes the level of judicial scrutiny required for this type
of individualized, monetary exaction from that of legislatively enacted impact fees.
II. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY CONTROLLING ABUSE OF POWER
The starting premise for judicial review of local government land-use
regulation is that the use of police power is presumed to be constitutionally valid.51
This traditional judicial deference may be modified, as it was in the Dolan decision,
in order to monitor adjudicative decisions.52 Certain government land-use actions
may go astray from the rule of law because they are adjudicated or negotiated
through individualized, case-by-case decision-making. 53 Professors Fennell and
Peñalver examine these deviations in the exactions context and determine that
because of the concern about arbitrariness, favoritism, and corruption, “the Court
might be understood [in its exaction decisions] as attempting to structure bargaining
between governments and developers in ways that increase the conformity of that

48

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 46 (concluding that this supervision “does not appear
to be a helpful way to rationalize the web of local regulation”).
50
See id. at 4 (noting that “[z]oning is the product of state law” and common-law
adjudication has promoted “[c]ross-state similarities” that has “generated a national
framework for zoning”); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for
Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751, 762 (2009) (“[S]tate courts, not federal courts,
should be centrally responsible for limiting eminent domain abuses by state and local
agencies.”).
51
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 241 (citing Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
52
Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994) (stating that because
the decision to condition the building permit was adjudicative in nature, the burden rests on
the city to prove validity)).
53
Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 20, at 312 (referencing Lon Fuller’s “eight ways that
state action may deviate from the rule of law. Those are: (1) a failure to generate generally
applicable rules (‘generality’), ‘so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis;’ (2)
a failure to publicize the law; (3) excessive use of retroactive legislation; (4) the use of rules
that are not intelligible; (5) the enactment of rules that contradict one another; (6) use of rules
that are beyond the power of the regulated party to follow; (7) changing rules too frequently;
and (8) permitting ‘a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual
administration’”).
49
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bargaining to the formal requirements of the rule of law.” 54 Concerns about
excessive government discretion and the potential for abuse may justify heightened
scrutiny of exactions, but these concerns also support state-law standards of
increased scrutiny over administrative decisions, spot zoning, contract zoning,
piecemeal rezoning, variances and conditional uses, and in some states, the standard
of review for due process claims.55
In Exactions Creep, Fennell and Peñalver focus on exactions and only lightly
touch upon the state-law standards. 56 They offer several alternatives for a path
toward addressing the “confused and unsustainable state” of exactions and takings
jurisprudence resulting from the Court’s decision in Koontz.57 These alternatives
include 1) relying on the legislative/adjudicative distinction to determine heightened
scrutiny; 2) applying heightened scrutiny to everything except taxes and fees; 3)
applying other approaches to determine whether heightened scrutiny will be
triggered, such as looking at the nature of the burden itself, distinguishing between
payments to the government and expenditures to your own property, and reviewing
the multiple options presented by the government; 4) applying heightened scrutiny
to all land-use regulations; or 5) removing exactions from the takings analysis and
instead analyzing them under substantive due process or based upon state-law
doctrines.58
This Article advocates for a hybrid approach that employs several of the
alternatives presented by Fennell and Peñalver. It uses the legislative/adjudicative
distinction and relies upon state land-use doctrines to fill the interstices between
current federal takings and exaction law and questions unanswered by Koontz.59 In
support of this approach, Part II discusses in detail the various state law doctrines
and some federal law standards that are applied to land-use actions to determine
whether judicial scrutiny of government action should be deferential or require
heightened scrutiny. This Part also addresses the rudiments of land-use law,
including: (A) legislative versus administrative actions; (B) spot zoning challenges
and conformity to the general plan; (C) the impermissible delegation of legislative
power; (D) neighborhood zoning and consent requirements, initiative and
referendum authority, and how the people can also “behave badly” through ballotbox zoning; (E) eminent domain challenges; and (F) facial versus applied
challenges, and the challenges to regulatory land-use actions that impact First
Amendment rights, including religious exercise. The established and underlying
framework of land-use law has, at its roots, the desire to prevent unfair dealing and
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Id. at 24.
Id. at 59–60.
56
Id.
57
See id. at 46–60.
58
Id.
59
See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 242–43 (noting that state law adequately limits
development exactions and “remains as the main source of policy and legal guidance for
impact fee practices[,]” allowing states to control their own policies).
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abuse that may result when government officials have too much discretion and stray
from the rule of law.
A. The Legislative vs. Administrative Distinction
Legislative action in local government has traditionally received strong
deference when subjected to judicial challenge. The challenger has the burden of
showing that the government entity did not have a rational basis for exercising its
police power to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
community.60 This deference is given because legislative action generally affects
larger areas of the community without regard to who owns the property interests
being regulated. In addition, legislative actors are subject to the electorate voicing
support or criticism.61
Administrative, also called adjudicative or quasi-judicial, actions tend to affect
individual landowners and are, therefore, considered susceptible to government
favoritism or discrimination.62 While the government entity is still held to providing
a rational basis for its decision, it has the burden of showing that substantial evidence
supported its decision.63 When defending legislative actions, the government need
only supply a rational basis for its action, even if the rationale is presented for the
first time at trial. 64 Conversely, when defending administrative actions, the
government must show substantial evidence of a rationale at the time the action was
originally taken.65
Zoning regulation is a legislative process and receives deferential treatment by
the courts. 66 Rezoning is typically considered legislative in nature, but there are
some states that require closer scrutiny and treat it as administrative if it involves a

60

Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395–96.
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 219.
62
While this Article groups administrative and quasi-judicial decisions together for
purposes of distinguishing these actions from legislative action, it should be noted that
administrative decisions may be considered ministerial or nondiscretionary action that may
not require a hearing, but that quasi-judicial actions do require discretion and thus will
require a hearing. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 161
(6th ed. 2012) (noting that other consequences such as government immunity may follow the
determination of whether a decision is administrative or quasi-judicial).
63
The requirement that administrative decisions be “supported by substantial evidence”
is also asserted in federal administrative law cases. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell,
Ga., 135 S. Ct. 808, 818–19 (2015) (holding that federal administrative law doctrines apply
to state and local governments in and under the Federal Communications Act, and local
governments have power over siting and zoning of cell towers, but must meet certain federal
limitations, including the requirement to support its denial of wireless infrastructure requests
in a writing supported by substantial evidence).
64
F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
65
United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963).
66
Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 571 (1980).
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single landowner, or small number of landowners. 67 Rezoning that individually
affects landowners, either positively or negatively, can also be challenged as “spot
zoning,” discussed below, and may require increased scrutiny.68
The grant or denial of a conditional-use permit or a variance request will be
treated as administrative and requires substantial evidence in the file to support the
decision made by the government.69 In many municipalities, there will be different
governmental bodies making either the legislative or the administrative decisions.
City councils will serve as the legislative bodies, and boards of adjustment or
planning commissions may serve as the administrative entities. Courts sometimes
look to the body making the decision to determine whether it was legislative or
administrative in nature, but in some regions the same governmental body, most
likely the city council, will make all of the decisions. Thus, courts must look to both
the nature of the government body making the decision and to the nature of the
decision itself and whether it impacts an individual landowner or landowners in
general.70
While many courts have recognized the distinction between legislative and
administrative actions, some courts and scholars have challenged this distinction and
have supported increasing the scrutiny of government decision-making regardless
of the classification.71 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in both Dolan and Lingle
67

Id.
See infra Section II.B.
69
Arnel, 620 P.2d at 569.
70
See 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003)
(contrasting the Second and Seventh Circuit tests for determining whether an action is
legislative or adjudicatory).
71
See Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640–
41 (Tex. 2004) (noting that despite the justification given by the California Supreme Court
in San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002), for applying the Dolan
standard to adjudicative decisions only, the Texas Supreme Court is “not convinced” that a
“workable distinction can always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and
legislative”); James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary
Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 410
(2009) (noting difference between legislative and administrative actions is negligible);
Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land Use Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10100, 10104 (2000) (stating that there is difficultly in distinguishing legislative from
administrative actions); Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the
Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 488–89 (2006) (noting that no
constitutional difference exists between legislative and administrative takings); Gideon
Kanner, Tennis Anyone? How California Judges Made Land Ransom and Art Censorship
Legal, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 214, 230 (1997) (discussing the Ehrlich decision and criticizing the
view that Nollan and Dolan should not apply if the exaction is imposed by ordinance, rather
than by an individualized decision, reasoning that “the constitutionality of an exaction would
depend not on its legitimacy or its impact, but only on the identity of the municipal body
demanding it”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511,
537–39 (2012) (noting the difficulty of “drawing a line between ‘legislative’ and
‘adjudicative’ exactions” and that the Nollan and Dolan facts involve legislative, not
adjudicative decisions); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 279, 288–89 (2011) (stating that the nexus and proportionality of legislative and
administrative tests is subject to debate); see also Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of
68
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has endorsed this distinction between legislative and adjudicative land-use
regulations. 72 The Court in Dolan distinguished the land-use regulations it had
upheld in its earlier decisions in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,73
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 74 and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 75 from the
unconstitutional conditions imposed on the landowners in Nollan and Dolan based
on the fact that its earlier decisions “involved essentially legislative determinations
classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here [Dolan] the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on
an individual parcel.”76 The Court in Lingle found this distinction relevant when it
described its exactions jurisprudence from “Nollan and Dolan as involving
‘adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a
condition of obtaining a development permit.’”77
A landowner who complains of being treated unfairly by local land-use officials
will typically frame a judicial challenge as a violation of substantive due process.78
Federal courts are generally unfriendly to such challenges, as expressed by Judge
Posner in the Seventh Circuit case Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates.79
This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the
trappings of constitutional law—a sure sign of masquerade being that the
plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of the zoning ordinances
of the Village of Hoffman Estates but argue rather than [sic] the Board of
Trustees had no authority under those ordinances to reject their site plan
once the Village Plan Commission had approved it. If the plaintiffs can
get us to review the merits of the Board of Trustees’ decision under state
law, we cannot imagine what zoning dispute could not be shoehorned into
federal court in this way, there to displace or postpone consideration of
some worthier object of federal judicial solicitude. Something more is
necessary than dissatisfaction with the rejection of a site plan to turn a
Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between
sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings appears to be a
distinction without a constitutional difference.”).
72
See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 533–34.
73
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
74
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
75
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
76
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also Mulvaney, Exactions for
the Future, supra note 71, at 533–34 (noting that “the Court strongly implied—if not
expressly declared—that the strictures of Dolan (and by implication Nollan) are inapplicable
to exactions that are part of a community plan and broadly applicable”).
77
Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 534 (quoting Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546–47 (2005)).
78
See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing the highly deferential view of
substantive due process challenges with the test being “whether the regulation has a rational
basis or a reasonable relation to the traditional police-power purposes of zoning, promotion
of the health, safety, and general welfare of the community”).
79
844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988).
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zoning case into a federal case; and it should go without saying that the
something more cannot be merely a violation of state (or local) law. A
violation of state law is not a denial of due process of law.80
Judge Posner also discussed the legislative/administrative distinction and noted
that this “difference is critical” because judicial review of legislative decisions is
much broader than the review of zoning decisions that are adjudicative in nature.81
In addition to the Seventh Circuit approach to land-use substantive due process
claims, other federal courts have given great deference to zoning decisions, requiring
the plaintiff to show that the decision was outrageously arbitrary or so unfair that it
“shock[s] the conscience of the court.”82
In Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 83 the Court corrected its earlier confusion
between takings claims and substantive due process challenges, 84 so that the
government need only show that it has acted rationally to defeat a due process
challenge. Litigants who believe that unfair or arbitrary regulation has devalued their
property will seek just compensation as a taking rather than invalidation under due
process.85 Such a takings challenge to legislative action will be analyzed using the
Penn Central factors (severity of the impact, interference with investment-backed
expectations, and character of the government action),86 unless the property owner
80

Id. at 467 (citations omitted).
Id. at 468; see also FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that administrative decisions
are scrutinized “more carefully because, goes one theory, parties who lose from an
administrative decision have fewer political roads to correct them than they do in legislative
matters”).
82
See Cenergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1, LLC v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 485,
488 (7th Cir. 2014) (“On the issue of arbitrariness, we have said that a land-use decision
must ‘shock the conscience’ to run afoul of the Constitution. Bettendorf v. St. Croix County,
631 F.3d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 2011). We also have suggested that the action must have been
‘arbitrary and capricious,’ Centres, 148 F.3d at 704, or ‘random and irrational,’ General Auto
Service Station, 526 F.3d at 1000. In yet another formulation, the Supreme Court has
explained that a land-use decision must be arbitrary to the point of being ‘egregious’ to
implicate substantive due process. Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 198, 123 S. Ct. 1389. These
standards should not be viewed as distinct, at least in the land-use context. In Cuyahoga
Falls, the Supreme Court relied upon County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846,
118 S. Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), for the proposition that ‘only the most egregious
official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense’ (internal quotation
marks omitted), and Lewis itself, see 523 U.S. at 855, 118 S. Ct. 1708, applied the ‘shock the
conscience’ standard.”); DANIEL K. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 2.39, 2.46 (5th ed.
2003 & Supp. 2005) (citing, e.g., Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 259 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding it is “outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental
authority”); Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating
harassment, delays, and improper application of subdivision regulations does not shock the
conscience).
83
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
84
Id. at 548.
85
See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that “[t]he case that is now regarded as the
lodestar of regulatory takings, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), was
originally discussed in the legal literature as a due process case”).
86
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
81
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can show that a per se taking has occurred under either Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 87 which requires a permanent physical invasion of real
property, or Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council,88 which addresses regulation
that deprives owners of all economically beneficial use of their real property. In
Lingle, the Court addressed a takings challenge to a statutory rent cap on leases of
gasoline service stations and determined that one of the two prongs of a takings test
developed by the Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon89 was not an appropriate test for
a taking.90 Whereas in Agins, the Court declared that “[t]he application of a general
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land,”91 the Lingle Court reclassified the “substantially advances”
prong from a takings test to a substantive due process claim. However, the Court
retained the Nollan/Dolan takings test for exactions even though it was originally
developed from the Agins “substantially advances” takings test.92 This remaining
incongruity gives fodder to those who argue that Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz should
be treated as substantive due process, not takings, challenges.93
The Koontz decision held that individualized monetary exactions would be
subject to Nollan/Dolan, but did not resolve the question of whether legislatively
enacted monetary fees would also be scrutinized under this higher standard.94 The
controversy over the legislative/administrative distinction remains,95 even though it
has been observed that:
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458 U.S. 419 (1982).
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
89
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
90
544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
91
447 U.S. at 260 (emphases added).
92
544 U.S. at 547–48.
93
Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 543–48 (discussing the
relationship between due process and takings review). See generally Fennell & Peñalver,
supra note 20, at 291 (distinguishing takings challenges and due process challenges).
94
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013).
95
See Eagle, supra note 24, at 6 (observing that the major issue “left unanswered after
Koontz is whether the doctrine applies not only to adjudicative decisions by administrators
but also to legislative determinations”); Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a
Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 754–
55 (2007) (noting the need for heightened scrutiny because there is a greater risk of unfair
bargaining with individualized exactions than with legislative assessments); John Martinez,
What Color Is the Number Seven? Category Mistake Analysis and the “Legislative/NonLegislative” Distinction, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 11–20 (2014) (discussing the difficulty in
appropriately distinguishing between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative situations and
examining the theory of category mistake in using the legislative/nonlegislative distinction
in the exactions setting); Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative
Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 266 (2000) (observing that
perhaps lower courts have been confused in interpreting Dolan because of the difficulty of
distinguishing legislative from adjudicative decisions).
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With near uniformity, lower courts applying Dolan to monetary exactions
have done so only when the exaction has been imposed through an
adjudicatory process; they have expressly declined to use Dolan’s
heightened scrutiny in testing development or impact fees imposed on
broad classes of property pursuant to legislatively adopted fee schemes.96
As previously noted, not everyone has accepted the relevance of the distinction
between legislative and individualized government actions in all situations.97 For
example, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture,98 the Ninth Circuit applied the
Nollan/Dolan test to a raisin marketing restriction that was legislatively enacted and
directed to all who sent raisins into the stream of commerce.99 The court noted that
“[i]ndividualized review makes sense in the land-use context because the
development of each parcel is considered on a case-by-case basis[,]” but it applied
the Nollan/Dolan test to the legislative action in the raisin case, partly because
“raisins are fungible (as opposed to land, which is unique).”100 In an earlier footnote,
the court explained that:
We do not mean to suggest that all use restrictions concerning personal
property must comport with Nollan and Dolan. Rather, we hold Nollan
and Dolan provide an appropriate framework to decide this case given the
96

Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Wash. Cty., 45 P.3d 966, 977 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis
in original); see also McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding alternatively that if it did constitute a monetary exaction it would not be subject to
Nollan/Dolan, subjecting a storm pipe requirement to Penn Central review rather than
Nollan/Dolan test because regulation does not create a monetary exaction, but instead
“provides an across-the-board requirement for all new developments”); Krupp v.
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001) (noting that “[o]ne critical
difference between a legislatively based fee and a specific, discretionary adjudicative
determination is that the risk of leveraging or extortion on the part of the government is
virtually nonexistent in a fee system”); Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d
875, 879–80 (Colo. App. 2008), aff’d, 220 P.3d 559 (Colo. 2009) (discussing that drainage
requirements imposed on landowners were legislatively determined so that the Regulatory
Impairment of Property Rights Act requiring Nollan/Dolan scrutiny was not applicable
because the monetary fee was not “determined on an individual and discretionary basis”).
97
See Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 515 U.S. 1116, 1116–18 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “lower courts are in conflict over whether Dolan’s test
for property regulation should be applied in cases where the alleged taking occurs through
an Act of the legislature” and eschewing the “distinction between sweeping legislative
takings and particularized administrative takings”); B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt
Lake Cty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1168–69, 1171 (Utah 2006) (noting that although recent
legislation provides that all exactions, whether legislative or adjudicative, must be subject to
the rough proportionality test derived from Nollan/Dolan, Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-507
(Supp. 2005) could not be applied retroactively and “we are hard pressed to find a reason to
assume that the legislative view of the proper scope of the rough proportionality test would
have been different before section 17-27a-507 went into effect”).
98
750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
99
Id. at 1144.
100
Id.
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significant but not total loss of the Hornes’ possessory and dispositional
control over their reserved raisins.101
The court determined that requiring all raisin producers to reserve a certain
percentage of their crop in order to regulate prices, was not a seizure of their crops,
but was instead a condition on the use of their crops, subject to Nollan/Dolan.102
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in Horne and held
that the government’s duty to pay just compensation for a physical per se taking
applies to personal property as well as to real property, and that the Raisin Marketing
Order at issue was a per se taking under Loretto.103 The Court’s decision in Horne
makes it clear that there is no distinction between real and personal property for
determining if the private property is subject to a per se taking. The more appropriate
distinction should be between what is considered a confiscation of real or personal
property and what is considered a regulation of real or personal property.
The legislation at issue in Loretto was challenged as a regulatory taking, but
because of the nature of the action in requiring a permanent and physical occupation
of the property, the Court held it to be a per se taking, a confiscation, not subject to
the Penn Central balancing factors.104 A similar distinction between confiscation
and regulation of personal property was evident in the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Nixon v. United States,105 which held that the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act (“PRMPA”) was a per se taking of President Nixon’s personal
property because the government took complete possession and control of Nixon’s
papers. 106 The court noted that “[a]lthough a great public interest may justify a
taking, it does not convert the taking into mere regulation.” 107 The court
distinguished between a regulation that might affect Nixon’s property rights and the
application of the PRMPA statute, which took away his right to exclude, and left
Nixon with only a few rights in the materials that were “so fractured that his original
property interest has been destroyed.”108
In the context of land-use permitting, the distinction between confiscation and
regulation of real property is less clear. In Nollan, the Court determined that the
easement sought by the California Coastal Commission to cross the Nollans’
beachfront property was a “‘permanent physical occupation’” under the Loretto rule
of per se taking because the public is given “a permanent and continuous right to
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Id. at 1141 n.18.
Id. at 1144.
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Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015) (noting that direct
appropriations of real property and personal property must be treated alike under the Fifth
Amendment).
104
Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438–40 (1982).
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978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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Id. at 1284.
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pass to and fro.”109 Requiring the Nollans to give the state an easement would be a
confiscation of property requiring just compensation.110 However, in the context of
the permit process, the Court addressed the question of whether requiring the
easement as a condition for granting a land-use permit would still result in a
taking.111 Because the Coastal Commission could refuse to issue the permit if the
development would interfere with the public’s right to use the beach, the Court
agreed with the Commission that “a permit condition that serves the same legitimate
police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a
taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking.” 112 The
Nollan/Dolan framework was based on the concept that a physical exaction is a per
se taking under Loretto, but because the exaction is part of a permitting process
whereby the government could refuse to grant the permit, the government can
instead place conditions on the permit in order to offset the externalities created by
the development.
The Nollan/Dolan test was developed to increase the scrutiny for physical
exactions because of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the concern about
individual permitting and the potential for governmental abuse of power.113 Koontz
extended Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to monetary exactions, which seems appropriate
because even though it is not a physical invasion of real property, money is being
sought in lieu of the physical exaction. The Koontz Court expressed concerns about
the ease by which land-use permitting officials could “evade the limitations of
Nollan and Dolan” if review is not applied to in-lieu exactions.114
The Ninth Circuit should not have applied the Nollan/Dolan analysis in Horne
based on the reasoning of Koontz, but instead should have determined whether the
Raisin Marketing Order was a confiscation of raisins or a regulation of raisin
handlers. Based on the framework that has been established for land-use regulation,
applying the Nollan/Dolan test to a personal property takings challenge would be
appropriate only if there were an administrative permitting process whereby the
government could refuse approval to allow a use of personal property (without such
refusal constituting a taking), but instead condition its approval on the property
owner’s willingness to turn over personal property in exchange for the permit.
Horne, on the other hand, did not involve an exaction—either physical or
109

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987).
Id. at 841–42.
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Id. at 834.
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Id. at 835–36.
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Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (quoting Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (noting that Nollan and Dolan “involve a special
application of the ‘doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,’ which provides that ‘the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no
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Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013).
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monetary—and it is unrelated to land-use regulation with the accompanying
concerns about abuse of the government’s discretion in granting permits.115 Instead,
as held by the Supreme Court, the Raisin Marketing Order constituted a confiscation
of the product and resulted in a per se taking under Loretto.116 If the Order had been
determined to be a regulation of personal property, the takings challenge would have
been analyzed using the Penn Central factors examining the severity of the impact,
the interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action, and not Nollan/Dolan because the raisins were not being
regulated as part of a permitting process.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Horne of treating a legislatively enacted
restriction on personal property as a monetary exaction subject to the Nollan/Dolan
test was also applied to an affordable housing regulation in Levin v. City and County
of San Francisco. 117 In Levin, the federal district court held that an ordinance
requiring property owners to pay a lump sum amount to displaced tenants before
they are permitted to withdraw rent-controlled property from the rental market was
facially unconstitutional as a taking of property because it failed to meet the
Nollan/Dolan standard for monetary exactions.118 The court was not persuaded by
the City’s argument that Nollan/Dolan analysis does not apply to a facial takings
claim nor does it apply to legislatively imposed exactions.119 Instead, the Levin court
referenced the Ninth Circuit’s Horne decision as “reinforc[ing] the applicability of
the Nollan/Dolan framework to facial reviews of legislative exactions.” 120 In
contrast, the California Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County
of San Francisco121 (another case involving affordable housing in San Francisco)
noted:
While legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper
leveraging, such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary
restraints of the democratic political process. A city council that charged
extortionate fees for all property development, unjustifiable by mitigation
needs, would likely face widespread and well-financed opposition at the
next election. Ad hoc individual monetary exactions deserve special
115

Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430–31 (distinguishing Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) on the basis that Monsanto received a “valuable
Government benefit” to sell hazardous chemicals in exchange for turning over safety
information, including trade secret property interests; whereas in Horne, as in Nollan, the
takings at issue were not part of a voluntary exchange, but were instead “basic and familiar
uses of property”—the right to “[s]ell[] produce in interstate commerce” and “the right to
build on one’s own property”).
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Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2430.
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71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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judicial scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer citizens and evading
systematic assessment, they are more likely to escape such political
controls.122
San Francisco may have overreached in its affordable-housing legislation
challenged in Levin, but the takings challenge should have been analyzed using
Loretto, if the required payment to displaced tenants constituted a confiscation,123 or
using the Penn Central factors if the housing ordinance is considered to be
regulation.
The Levin court also dismissed the “City’s reliance on McClung v. City of
Sumner, 124 . . . for the argument that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to legislative
conditions,” by noting Koontz’s abrogation of “McClung’s holding that
Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions.” 125 In McClung, the
landowners needed a permit to develop a Subway sandwich shop and parking lot,
but the existing storm drain was not sufficient.126 The City ordinance required all
landowners to install a twelve-inch storm drain, but the City offered the McClungs
a reduction of permitting fees if they would install a twenty-four-inch storm drain
instead.127 The Ninth Circuit considered the ordinance requiring all landowners to
install a twelve-inch storm drain to be a legislative act, subject to the Penn Central
test for any takings claim analysis, because it was a generally applicable
development requirement to address flooding.128 The court held that the McClungs
impliedly contracted to install the twenty-four-inch drain, so it was unnecessary to
decide whether this individualized request would be subject to Nollan/Dolan
scrutiny.129 It also disagreed with the landowners’ characterization of the twelveinch drain requirement as a monetary exaction, but stated that even if it could be so
characterized, monetary exactions are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan test.130
Unfortunately, it is not clear from the Koontz decision whether McClung was
abrogated because of its statement that monetary exactions are not subject to
Nollan/Dolan or because it distinguished between legislative and administrative
actions in order to determine the review standard.131 The Levin court rejected the
122

Id. at 105.
See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430. But see Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d
at 1080–81 (noting that Loretto is not applicable because “the government effects a physical
taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his
land”).
124
548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008).
125
71 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 n.4.
126
548 F.3d at 1222.
127
Id. at 1222–23.
128
Id. at 1227.
129
Id. at 1228.
130
Id.
131
See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594 (“[A] division of authority over whether a demand
for money can give rise to a claim under Nollan and Dolan, and sided with those courts that
have said it cannot.” (comparing, e.g., McClung, 548 F.3d at 1228, with Ehrlich v. City of
123

2016]

WHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT MISBEHAVES

125

significance of the legislative distinction based on Koontz’s abrogation of
McClung’s holding that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions. 132
However, the Koontz decision itself points out the division of authority over
monetary exactions and compares McClung to the Ehrlich v. City of Culver City133
decision.134 In Ehrlich, the City required the developer to provide funds to mitigate
the loss of public recreation in exchange for permitting the conversion of a private
tennis club and recreational facility to a condominium development. 135 The
California Supreme Court determined that monetary exactions must be scrutinized
under the Nollan/Dolan standard and remanded to the City the question of whether
the monetary exaction was justified.136 However, it did uphold an impact fee for art
in public places as a regulatory fee not subject to Nollan/Dolan review.137
In contrast to McClung, the Ehrlich court did subject monetary exactions to the
Nollan/Dolan test, but Ehrlich also used the legislative/administrative distinction to
differentiate between the legislative fees for art that were not subject to
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny,138 and the administrative request for a monetary exaction for
recreation that was subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.139 If this issue is presented to
the Ninth Circuit at some point in the future, further clarity—or confusion—may be
introduced into this controversy. 140 Not only will the Ninth Circuit need to
reexamine its application of Nollan/Dolan to legislation involving personal property
after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Horne, but it will also need to take into
consideration the California Supreme Court’s holding in California Building
Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996) (citing Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford
Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640–641 (Tex. 2004)).
132
71 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 n.4.
133
911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
134
See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594.
135
Erhlich, 911 P.2d at 434–35 (holding that this monetary exaction was imposed after
the City determined it could not afford to purchase the parcel outright for public recreation).
136
Id. at 449–50.
137
Id. at 450.
138
See id. at 450 (agreeing with the city “that the art in public places fee is not a
development exaction of the kind subject to the Nollan–Dolan takings analysis” and finding
it “more akin to traditional land use regulations imposing minimal building setbacks, parking
and lighting conditions, landscaping requirements, and other design conditions such as color
schemes, building materials and architectural amenities”).
139
Id. at 447 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124) (“[I]t
is not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard of scrutiny) of Nollan and
Dolan applies to cases in which the exaction takes the form of a generally applicable
development fee or assessment—cases in which the courts have deferred to legislative and
political processes to formulate ‘public program[s] adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good . . . .’ But when a local government imposes
special, discretionary permit conditions on development by individual property owners—as
in the case of the recreational fee at issue in this case—Nollan and Dolan require that such
conditions, whether they consist of possessory dedications or monetary exactions, be
scrutinized under the heightened standard.”).
140
Koontz and San Francisco Rent Control, TAKINGSLITIGATION.COM (Oct. 26, 2014),
http://takingslitigation.com/2014/10/26/koontz-and-san-francisco-rent-control/
[http://perma.cc/W7CN-7DXE].
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Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 141 which distinguished affordable housing
ordinances that address specific adverse impacts caused by the developers, from
legislative regulation of land use based on the broader public interest.142 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit may need to address its earlier opinion in Commercial Builders of
Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 143 which applied Nollan to city
legislation requiring the payment of a fee for nonresidential building permits to
expand low-income housing in order to offset the burdens of low-income workers
coming to the city to fill the jobs created.144 This case was decided before the Dolan
decision and the court found a nexus under Nollan between the development and fee
provision. 145 The court affirmed the district court decision that the low-income
housing fee was not an unconstitutional taking because there was a nexus between
the fee and the impact from commercial development.146
The better interpretation of Koontz’s abrogation of McClung is that it was based
on McClung’s suggestion that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions,
rather than because McClung distinguished between legislative and administrative
actions and subjected legislative actions to Penn Central. Indeed, the Supreme Court
in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel147 observed that “economic regulation such as the
Coal Act may . . . effect a taking,”148 but should nonetheless be evaluated under the
three Penn Central factors because the retroactive liability of the company for retired
miners is not a permanent physical occupation of the company’s property and does
not constitute a per se taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp. 149 As briefly discussed earlier in the Introduction, the plurality in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel applied the three-factor test developed in Penn Central to
analyze the constitutionality of the retroactive liability. 150 Noting that the Penn
Central test was also applied to multiemployer pension plan liability in Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,151 the plurality in Eastern Enterprises concluded
“that the Coal Act’s application to Eastern effects an unconstitutional taking.”152
141

Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied,
2016 WL 763863 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (noting that
while “this case does not present an opportunity to resolve the conflict[]” as to “whether
cities can legislatively impose exactions that would not pass muster if done
administratively[,]” the Court should decide “what legal standard governs legislative
ordinances” in order to resolve this uncertainty for local governments).
142
See extended discussion in Part III, infra notes 399–411.
143
Comm’l Builders of No. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
144
Id. at 873.
145
Id. at 874 (noting that Nollan did not materially change the requirement that the
legislation be “reasonably related to legitimate public purposes”).
146
Id. at 875–76.
147
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
148
Id. at 523.
149
Id. at 529–30.
150
Id. at 529–37.
151
475 U.S. 211 (1986).
152
524 U.S. at 537.
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However, Justice Kennedy, who concurred with the judgment for Eastern
Enterprises based on a due process violation, dissented from the taking holding,
asserting that for regulatory takings challenges there must be “a specific property
right or interest . . . at stake.”153 Thus, legislatively developed economic regulation
can constitute a taking, but should be analyzed under the Loretto standard, the threefactor Penn Central framework, or even as a Lucas per se taking if the facts justify,
rather than under the Nollan/Dolan standard.
Recognizing the distinction between generalized legislative regulation and
adjudicative administrative government action may be the key to limiting the scope
of heightened judicial scrutiny over monetary fees following the Koontz decision.
The controversy over the relevance of this distinction has existed for years before
the Court’s decision in Koontz to treat monetary exactions the same as physical
exactions.154 These conflicting views as to whether the nexus and proportionality
test will apply not only to physical exactions, but to legislatively imposed fees, such
as conservation restrictions and impact fees, remain following the Koontz decision
to subject “monetary exactions” to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.155 The Nollan/Dolan test
was developed as an exception to Loretto based on the bargaining nature of
permitting, which would allow the government to deny the permit, so long as it does
not constitute a taking under Penn Central, or condition the grant of the permit so
long as the condition passes Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. The Nollan/Dolan test should
not be applied outside the context of either physical or monetary exaction conditions
imposed during the land-use permitting process.
B. Spot Zoning and Conformity to the General Plan
Legislative zoning or rezoning may be challenged as “spot zoning” when the
action affects a small parcel or small number of landowners in either a positive or
negative way. The challenge is based on the concern that the government is targeting
a particular landowner or group of landowners for either favorable or adverse
treatment, unrelated to the general welfare of the community as a whole.156 This
153
Id. at 539–44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring
with the plurality that the Coal Act’s application to Eastern violates due process because of
the retroactive imposition of financial liability, but dissenting from plurality’s conclusion
that the statute violated the Takings Clause).
154
See Adam J. McLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. 55,
70–75 (2012) (discussing judicial scrutiny over individualized assessments).
155
Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 71, at 287–89; see, e.g., Kanner, supra
note 71, at 230 (discussing the Ehrlich decision and criticizing the view that Nollan and
Dolan should not apply if the exaction is imposed by ordinance, rather than by an
individualized decision, reasoning that “the constitutionality of an exaction would depend
not on its legitimacy or its impact, but only on the identity of the municipal body demanding
it”).
156
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978)
(discussing the spot zoning challenge to landmark laws, which apply only to selected parcels,
but finding that “landmark laws are not like discriminatory, or ‘reverse spot,’ zoning: that is,
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distinction between legislative and administrative action is difficult to apply to
zoning because there is not always a strict separation of the legislative and
administrative branches. A municipality’s city council may legislatively change a
zoning law, but if it is tailored to specific parcels, it appears to be more
administrative since such spot zoning looks more like the administratively granted
zoning variance.157
Requiring the local government to show that its zoning actions conform to, or
are consistent with, the municipality’s general plan is another mechanism for
controlling abuse. In takings litigation, the judiciary tends to defer to government
planning efforts. Restrictions that are part of a comprehensive plan will generally
not be found to be a regulatory taking.158 Professor Timothy Mulvaney points out
that this tendency to favor planning reflects that “when the political branches act
comprehensively, rather than in a targeted way toward a particular individual, it is
far more likely that the ‘decision reflects a thoughtful, carefully considered
assessment of all relevant costs and benefits.’”159 Planning typically takes place at a
community level such that catering to individual interests may be reduced by
developing area-wide goals that are based on the municipality as a whole. Because
of the presumed neutrality of the planning process, the government can defend
against an allegation of spot zoning by showing that the action taken conforms to
the general plan, which is intended to benefit the community. A spot zoning
challenge can also be framed as a substantive due process violation, alleging that the
government has no rational basis under its police power authority to affect individual
landowners, or as an equal protection violation, arguing that the government is not
treating similarly situated individuals equally.
States have adapted different approaches to resolving spot zoning challenges.
For example, in California, rezoning is considered to be a quasi-legislative act, such
that the government action is scrutinized under an “arbitrary or capricious or totally
lacking in evidentiary support” standard of review, 160 rather than requiring the
substantial evidence necessary to support an adjudicative decision. In 2014, the
California appellate court in Foothill Communities Coalition v. County of Orange,161
stated that “[a] spot zone results when a small parcel of land is subject to more or
less restrictive zoning than surrounding properties”162 and held that “the creation of
an island of property with less restrictive zoning in the middle of properties with
a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less
favorable treatment than the neighboring ones”).
157
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 22.
158
Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 530.
159
Id. (quoting John D. Echeverria, The Triumph of Justice Stevens and the Principle
of Generality, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 22, 24 (2006)).
160
See Foothill Cmtys. Coal. v. Cty. of Orange, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 633 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014) (citing Avenida San Juan P’ship v. City of San Clemente, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 570,
579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)).
161
Id.
162
Id. at 635 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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more restrictive zoning is spot zoning.”163 The court first determined that the County
Board of Supervisors’ (“the Board”) action to create new zoning for senior citizen
housing on a single parcel of property owned by a local Diocese was spot zoning.164
The court then concluded that this spot zoning was “in the public interest and . . . not
arbitrary or capricious,”165 and that “the Board’s findings of consistency with the
general plan and the North Tustin Specific Plan are supported by substantial
evidence.”166
A somewhat similar approach is taken in Arkansas, which considers rezoning
to be a legislative act, subject to the arbitrary or capricious standard of judicial
review. In PH, LLC v. City of Conway,167 a land developer was denied a rezoning
request and the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the denial did not require de novo
review because rezoning was a legislative action and only administrative and quasijudicial actions were entitled to de novo review under state statutory law.168 The
court affirmed the lower court’s application of the standard for review of legislative
acts that “[t]he court should affirm the city council’s decision unless it was arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable[,]” and affirmed the lower court findings, which
included the finding that there was no reverse spot zoning or contract zoning at
issue.169 Addressing the developer’s claim that the property was entitled to rezoning
because it was “surrounded by parcels with different zoning designations,” the court
found that there was no reverse spot zoning because the city’s decision was
supported by legitimate traffic and safety concerns.170 In addition, the court declined
to determine whether contract zoning is permitted in Arkansas because even if it was
not allowed, there was no support for finding improper contract zoning in this
situation “where a city council considered a different, more suitable, zone
designation in determining whether to approve a petition to rezone.” 171 Thus, in
Arkansas, rezoning will typically be considered legislative and subject to deference
by the courts. This view appears to be even more deferential than California’s quasilegislative classification.
Likewise, spot zoning challenges in Pennsylvania require courts to “presume
the zoning ordinance is valid and constitutional; the burden of proving otherwise is
on the challenging party, who must show that the provisions are arbitrary and
unreasonable, and have no relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare.”172 When analyzing a spot zoning challenge, the Pennsylvania courts have
163

Id. at 637.
Id.
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Id. at 641.
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Id.
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344 S.W.3d 660 (Ark. 2009).
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Id. at 663, 666.
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Id. at 667.
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Id. at 669 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132
(1978) (noting that “[r]everse spot zoning is ‘a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles
out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones’”)).
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Id. at 669–70.
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Penn St., L.P. v. E. Lampeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 84 A.3d 1114, 1121 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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determined that the most important factor “is whether the parcel in question is being
treated unjustifiably different from similar surrounding land, thus creating an
‘island’ having no relevant differences from its neighbors.” 173 This seems to be
similar to the approach generally used for equal protection and substantive due
process claims against a challenged land-use decision, which gives a high level of
deference to the government action.
While states such as Arkansas, California, and Pennsylvania may subject spot
zoning to a deferential standard of review as a legislative or quasi-legislative action,
in many jurisdictions, a claim of spot zoning subjects the government action to
increased judicial scrutiny, and courts generally look to balance the benefit to the
community against the individualized impact on a landowner, either advantageous
or detrimental. The size of the parcel, the number of landowners affected, and
conformity with the general plan are important factors in determining whether
judicial scrutiny is necessary to prevent the abuse of local power. For example, in
New Jersey, a combination of factors may indicate that a land-use decision is either
spot zoning or inverse spot zoning and constitutes an invalid arbitrary and capricious
action. 174 These factors can include the rezoning of a parcel that makes it more
difficult for a landowner to develop; the rezoning was done at the insistence of
neighboring landowners; the rezoning was originally designated for a different area
and is not in compliance with the comprehensive plan; and the rezoning was done
without hearing from expert planners of consultants. 175 Examining these factors
requires heightened scrutiny, and while New Jersey recognizes that “the role of
courts in evaluating . . . [the adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance] is
‘circumscribed,’” it also appreciates that the legislative power to zone cannot be
exercised arbitrarily.176
Some states have applied an established standard to review actions by local
authorities that are challenged as illegal spot zoning. In North Carolina, for example,
the fact finder must first determine if the zoning activity constitutes spot zoning.177
Spot zoning is defined “as a zoning ordinance or amendment that ‘singles out and
reclassifies a relatively small tract owned by a single person and surrounded by a
much larger area uniformly zoned, so as to . . . relieve the small tract from
restrictions to which the rest of the area is subjected.’” 178 If the zoning does
constitute spot zoning, the court must decide whether “the zoning authority ma[de]
a clear showing of a reasonable basis for the zoning.”179 To determine whether there

173
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2008).
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(2001)).

Id.
Riya Finnegan LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 962 A.2d 484, 492 (N.J.
Id.
Id. at 489 (quoting Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren, 777 A.2d 334, 338
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See Etheridge v. Cty. of Currituck, 762 S.E.2d 289, 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Good Neighbors of S. Davidson v. Town of Denton, 559 S.E.2d 768, 771 (N.C.
2002)).
178
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
179
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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was a reasonable basis for the government’s decision, the North Carolina courts
consider the following factors (aka Chrismon factors):
(1) “the size of the tract in question”; (2) “the compatibility of the disputed
zoning action with an existing comprehensive zoning plan”; (3) “the
benefits and detriments resulting from the zoning action for the owner of
the newly zoned property, his neighbors, and the surrounding
community”; and (4) “the relationship between the uses envisioned under
the new zoning and the uses currently present in adjacent tracts.”
Chrismon [v. Guilford Cty.] . . . 370 S.E.2d [579,] 589 [(N.C. 1988)]. With
these factors in mind, “the criteria are flexible, and the specific analysis
used depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”180
This searching inquiry by North Carolina courts is far less deferential than that
applied to local land-use decisions by California, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania courts
and requires the government to “make a clear showing pursuant to any of the
Chrismon factors that the rezoning was a reasonable spot zoning.”181
Similar to North Carolina, South Carolina and Iowa courts evaluate spot zoning
challenges by breaking the analysis into two parts.182 First, the court determines
whether the action is spot zoning, and if it is, the court must decide whether the spot
zoning is valid. In South Carolina, spot zoning is defined as “the ‘process of singling
out a small parcel of land for use classification totally different from that of the
surrounding area, for the benefit of owners of such property and to [the] detriment
of other owners.’”183 In Iowa, the courts “consider the size of the spot zoned, the
uses of the surrounding property, the changing conditions of the area, the use to
which the subject property has been put and its suitability and adaptability for
various uses,” but the most important factor is “whether the rezoned tract has a
peculiar adaptability to the new classification as compared to the surrounding
property.”184 For the second step, the courts in South Carolina inquire as to whether
the “ordinance changes the zoning of a small area to a classification not consistent
with the area,” which is invalid spot zoning, or whether the zoning ordinance merely
expands an existing zoning classification, consistent with the city’s comprehensive

180

2007)).

181

Id. at 292–93 (quoting Childress v. Yadkin Cty., 650 S.E.2d 55, 61 (N.C. Ct. App.

Id. at 295 (concluding that the spot zoning of 1.1 acres of agriculturally zoned land
to heavy industrial zoning in order to accommodate a proposed recycling center was not a
reasonable spot zoning).
182
Historic Charleston Found. v. City of Charleston, 734 S.E.2d 306, 307 (S.C. 2012);
Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384, 387–88 (Iowa 1994).
183
Historic Charleston Found., 734 S.E.2d at 311 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (quoting
Knowles v. City of Aiken, 407 S.E.2d 639, 641 (S.C. 1991)).
184
Little, 518 N.W.2d at 387–88; Kane v. City Council of Cedar Rapids, 537 N.W.2d
718, 723 (Iowa 1995) (finding that the council’s approval of a revised development plan was
not illegal spot zoning).
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plan.185 Iowa courts, on the other hand, have a three-part test for deciding whether
the spot zoning is invalid.186 The courts must consider “(1) whether the new zoning
is germane to an object within the police power, (2) whether there is a reasonable
basis for making a distinction between the spot-zoned land and the surrounding
property, and (3) whether the rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan.”187
State differences in the standards used for judicial review of local government
decision making are appropriate given that land-use regulation is local in nature, and
that state views regarding the importance of municipality autonomy vary. For
example, Maine courts also apply a heightened scrutiny test to determine whether
spot zoning is illegal based upon whether the ordinance affects a single parcel for
the benefit of a particular landowner and is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan
or the character and zoning of the neighborhood in regards to the public health,
safety, and welfare.188 Montana applies a three-part test to evaluate “whether: (1)
‘the requested use is significantly different from the prevailing use in the area,’ (2)
‘the area in which the requested use is to apply is rather small,’ and (3) ‘the requested
change is more in the nature of special legislation.’”189 In Alaska, courts apply a
similar three-part inquiry and consider “(1) the consistency of the amendment with
the comprehensive plan; (2) the benefits and detriments of the amendment to the
owners, adjacent landowners, and community; and (3) the size of the area
‘rezoned.’”190
Nebraska courts evaluate claims of spot zoning based on the facts and
circumstances of each case, but will generally find that a zoning change is arbitrary
and capricious and illegal spot zoning if “a small parcel of land is singled out for
special and privileged treatment, the singling out is not in the public interest but
serves only the interests of the landowner, and the action is not in accord with a
comprehensive plan.”191 In Mississippi, the courts do not invalidate rezoning actions
as spot zoning so long as the zoning is in harmony with the comprehensive plan.192

185
Historic Charleston Found., 734 S.E.2d 306, 313 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority should hold the City to “its own duly adopted plan”).
186
Little, 518 N.W.2d at 388.
187
Id. (concluding that the rezoning ordinance at issue was invalid spot zoning).
188
See City of Old Town v. Dimoulas, 803 A.2d 1018, 1024 (Me. 2002) (finding that
the zoning ordinance adopted by voter referendum was not illegal spot zoning because the
City was not able to show that the ordinance was inconsistent with the comprehensive plan).
189
Helena Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Lewis & Clark Cty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n,
290 P.3d 691, 699 (Mont. 2012) (citing Little v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 631 P.2d 1282, 1289
(Mont. 1981)) (finding there was no illegal spot zoning or reverse spot zoning because the
zoning at issue was in compliance with the comprehensive plan and thus is not significantly
different than the prevailing use in the area and is not in the nature of special legislation).
190
Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1020, 1025 (Alaska 1996) (concluding
that rezoning did not constitute spot zoning).
191
Smith v. City of Papillion, 705 N.W.2d 584, 599 (Neb. 2005) (finding that “the
Homeowners did not prove that this case involves illegal spot zoning”); see also Giger v.
City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 197 (Neb. 1989) (noting factors for invalid spot zoning
and finding that developer did not “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the rezoning
ordinance was illegal spot zoning”).
192
Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So. 3d 25, 42 (Miss. 2010).
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States applying heightened scrutiny to spot zoning challenges appear to do so
because of the individualized nature of these actions. Giving deference to the
government does not seem appropriate when the concern is that an individual
landowner is singled out for either beneficial treatment or adverse discrimination
through spot zoning or inverse spot zoning. Conformity or consistency with a
comprehensive plan is an additional check on the government to make sure that landuse decisions are being made for the good of the community and not for the benefit
or detriment of an individual landowner.
C. Impermissible Delegation of Legislative Power
Individualized government decisions may be more closely scrutinized when the
legislature delegates decision-making powers to discrete local bodies such as a board
of adjustment or historic preservation commission. If the standards for deciding
whether an individual landowner is granted a right to develop are vague and subject
to manipulation by administrative discretion, a court may deem the delegation of
legislative power to be impermissible. This is a particular problem when aesthetic
and cultural standards are administered by nonlegislative bodies against individual
landowners.
Again, because of the individualized nature of the decision-making, the danger
of abuse exists when vaguely written guidelines leave room for discriminatory
interpretation outside of the standard legislative process. This is yet another example
where land-use principles guard against individualized decisions that are not applied
generally to a larger group of landowners. Judicial scrutiny is increased when the
legislative process allows for discretionary interpretations of regulatory standards
that impact individual landowners.
An example of this concern over inappropriate delegation of legislative power
is found in A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh,193 where the North Carolina Supreme
Court reviewed the state’s delegation of legislative power to municipalities for the
purpose of establishing historic district regulation.194 The court observed that the
“statutory authorization of historic district ordinances is . . . a mixture of delegated
legislative and administrative power” because it requires a historic district
commission to approve or disapprove applications for Certificates of
Appropriateness before exterior changes can be made to historic architectural
features. 195 This individualized determination has the potential for abuse of
discretion by the Historic District Commission.196 However, the A-S-P court held
that the combination of “architectural guidelines and design standards” and the
ordinance’s limit on the commission’s discretion “to prevent[] only those of certain
specified activities, ‘which would be incongruous with the historic aspects of the
193

258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979).
Id. at 451–52.
195
Id. at 452–53.
196
Id. at 455 (noting that “procedural safeguards provided will serve as an additional
check on potential abuse of the Historic District Commission’s discretion”).
194

134

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

district’” was sufficient to defeat a delegation challenge.197 More recently, a North
Carolina appellate court in Meares v. Town of Beaufort 198 held that a design
guideline used by the town’s historic preservation commission was more restrictive
than the guideline allowed by state statute and was, therefore, unlawful as outside
the authority delegated by the state.199
Similar concerns about improper delegation of legislative power for historic
preservation were voiced by the plaintiff in Lykes Bros., Inc. v. Architectural Review
Commission (“ARC”). 200 Plaintiff alleged that the city’s ordinance “‘d[id] not
provide sufficiently definite standards to guide action by the ARC or City Counsel
to ensure that property owners subject to the decision-making process [were]
protected from whimsical, capricious and otherwise arbitrary and discriminatory
decisions . . . .’”201 The federal district court in Lykes Bros., Inc., rejected the facial
challenge on the grounds of unlawful delegation of powers finding that the city’s
ordinance governing historic and cultural preservation contained “sufficiently
detailed standards to guide the exercise of administrative discretion.”202
The allegation that a government body has improperly delegated legislative
power is a call to more closely monitor situations where the decision-making power
is shifted from a legislative body making general and uniform laws to another body
that is making individualized decisions where the potential for discretionary abuse
is intensified. 203 Given that historic regulation, landmark preservation, and
architectural and aesthetic regulations may necessarily involve subjective decisionmaking, courts have generally upheld such delegation when the deciding body is
made up of individuals with expertise and the standards governing decision-making
are not impermissibly vague or ambiguous.204
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D. Initiative and Referendum (“The People” Misbehaving?)
Courts have at times prevented municipalities from establishing neighborhood
zoning and consent requirements by holding that delegating zoning power to
neighborhoods is unconstitutional.205 One of the early zoning ordinances enacted in
Chicago to deal with the adverse impacts of livery stables in residential
neighborhoods prohibited new stables unless nearby property owners gave written
permission.206 This 1887 ordinance was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court, which
reasoned that it was better to resolve these matters locally with those directly
affected rather than with a central body.207 However, later U.S. Supreme Court cases
cast doubt on this reasoning by 1) striking down, as an unconstitutional delegation
of power, a zoning ordinance permitting property owners bordering a street to
establish the building setback line;208 2) upholding a zoning ordinance prohibiting
billboards unless a majority of local property owners consented; 209 and 3)
invalidating a zoning ordinance prohibiting group homes unless a majority of
homeowners near the location consented.210
The major concern expressed by the Court in this line of cases is that giving
individual landowners control over their neighbors’ land use promotes selfinterested behavior and may constitute an improper delegation of legislative
authority that is subject to arbitrary and abusive land regulation. 211 While these
decisions are difficult to reconcile,212 they illustrate the judicial skepticism toward
exercising land-use power on an individualized basis, which tends to place selfinterest over the public good. The more localized the power, the more likely it is to
be abused.213 This concern about the abuse of localized power is also evident in
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State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117–
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challenges to initiatives and referenda actions based on allowing “the people” to
exercise legislative or adjudicative action directly through the ballot box.
An initiative is distinguished from a referendum based on the nature of the
action. When “the people” are exercising their power to initiate regulation on a
proactive basis, they are deemed to be acting in a legislative capacity. However, the
referendum is reactive in nature and is typically used to affirm or rescind regulatory
acts of a legislative body. A majority of states do not allow zoning by initiative, but
states are about evenly split as to whether legislative zoning acts should be subject
to the referendum process.
The initiative process generates procedural due process concerns because there
is no notice or hearing other than the political process, but the referendum process
presents less of a concern since it is preceded by legislative zoning action that
provides due process through open hearings. Another concern with this direct
democracy is that the voters may not be required to follow the comprehensive
planning document for the municipality and using an initiative or referendum will
result in “piecemeal” zoning that is not necessarily in the best interests of the entire
community. Finally, the use of initiatives may avoid the environmental impact
reviews that would otherwise be required of local legislatures.214
The Supreme Court sanctioned the use of the referendum process to approve or
reject zoning by the city council in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc..215 The developer challenged the city’s delegation of legislative power to the
people, but the Court held that the Ohio constitution expressly reserved the
legislative authority of the people and was, therefore, not subject to a charge of
“standardless” delegation.216 The Court distinguished its earlier decisions in Eubank
and Roberge on the basis that neither of those cases involved a referendum by the
people.217 Instead, Eubank and Roberge involved “the standardless delegation of
power to a limited group of property owners . . . not to be equated with
decisionmaking by the people through the referendum process.” 218 The dissent
expressed concern about the possibility of spot zoning because the rezoning at issue
involved a small lot and did not allow the landowner an opportunity to be heard by
the voters.219
This concern about the potential for unfair individualized decision-making is
the same administrative versus legislative distinction that the Court refused to
recognize in City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation. 220 In Cuyahoga Falls, the Court upheld the voters’ referendum to
invalidate a specific site plan that had been approved for a low-income housing
214
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project and affirmed its view that administrative land-use actions taken through the
referendum process do not violate due process. 221 Harkening back to its earlier
decision in Eastlake, the Court rejected the Ohio Supreme Court’s distinction
between legislative and administrative referendums in Cuyahoga Falls and affirmed
that subjecting either type of ordinance to the referendum process is not an unlawful
delegation of power, but is instead the people’s retained power to govern. 222 It
should be noted that voter actions, while not necessarily considered impermissible
delegation, are still subject to other constitutional challenges such as substantive due
process or equal protection violations.223
While the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit voters from acting on
administrative land-use decisions, states continue to control the use of the initiative
and referendum through constitutional and statutory provisions. States generally
prohibit delegating administrative or adjudicative decisions to voters because of due
process concerns, but may statutorily allow legislative actions to be exercised by
voters through initiative or referendum. In California, for example, the state
constitution provides that voters have the right to use the initiative and referendum
powers, but that “a referendum may be used to review only legislative acts and not
executive or administrative acts of a local government.”224 In Worthington v. City
Council of Rohnert Park, a California court reviewed the city’s action to establish a
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with a local Indian tribe addressing the
potential impacts of a casino project and determined that it was an administrative
action, not subject to referendum.225 Although the city’s action could be considered
a policy decision, voters in California are limited to adopting or rejecting statutes,
and the city’s negotiation with an Indian tribe is a contract, not a law, therefore it is
not legislation subject to referendum. 226 South Dakota also restricts the use of
referenda on administrative actions. In Schafer v. Deuel County Board of
Commissioners,227 initiative petitions were filed to amend certain zoning ordinances
so that the special exceptions provision requiring quasi-judicial review by
administrative boards would be treated as legislative action such that the voters
would have a right of referendum.228 The South Dakota Supreme Court refused to
allow the use of the initiative process to “define decisions that are quasi-judicial
administrative as legislative and thereby subject to referendum.”229
221
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Most states, based on the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, state legislation, or
judicial decision, require that zoning be either “in accordance with” or “consistent
with” a comprehensive plan, if one exists.230 In Hawaii, the Supreme Court has held
that zoning, while legislative, is not permitted through the initiative process because
it is inconsistent with the need for long-range planning.231 Similarly, the Washington
Supreme Court in 1000 Friends of Washington v. McFarland232 held that county
ordinances enacted to implement the Growth Management Act (“GMA”) were not
subject to local referenda.233 While recognizing “the vital importance of the rights
of local citizens to participate in policy decisions affecting their communities,”234
the court affirmed the state legislature’s exercise of power to mandate that counties
develop comprehensive land-use plans that are not subject to local referenda.235
Even if the state does not statutorily allow administrative or adjudicative types
of decisions to be referred to the people, some state constitutions, as noted by the
Court in Cuyahoga Falls may still reserve power in the people to exercise regulatory
power in all instances.236 For example, under a Utah statute, only legislative actions
are subject to referendum, and “site-specific rezoning decisions are statutorily
ineligible for referendum.” 237 Thus, the distinction between legislative and
administrative power is a decisive factor in determining whether voters in Utah can
demand a vote on local laws. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Krejci v. City of
Saratoga Springs held that “the people’s power to legislate is not a creature of
statute” and that the statutory provision did not override the authority of the people
as reserved in Utah’s Constitution. 238 The court then found that the site-specific
rezoning at issue, which rezoned twelve acres of property owned by one landowner
from a low density to a medium density residential zone, was a legislative action
subject to referendum based on the state constitution.239 While it appears that the
state statute was attempting to exclude administrative type of actions, such as sitespecific rezoning, from referendum authority, the court determined that “[t]he chief
hallmarks of legislative action . . . the adoption of rules of general applicability and
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the ‘weighing of broad, competing policy considerations’” had been met by sitespecific zoning.240
State constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions differ as to whether the
police power delegated by the state to municipalities and counties can be shared by
the people through the use of initiative and referendum. In some states, the power is
considered to be reserved for the people even while it has also been delegated to
local entities. The distinction between legislative action and administrative action is
important in those states that limit the initiative and referendum process to legislative
action only. Even in states that allow initiatives and referenda to be used for
legislative action, the process may be restricted when necessary to conform or be
consistent with comprehensive planning. These distinctions, controls, and
restrictions expressed through this patchwork of state statutes and judicial decisions
are intended to control abuse of the land-use planning process by limiting
individualized actions of self-interested local citizens through piecemeal, ballot-box
zoning.
E. Eminent Domain
The government’s use of the eminent domain power, which allows
condemnation of property for public use so long as just compensation is paid, is
inevitably an individualized land-use action because it involves the valuation and
transfer of individual parcels of land. Nonetheless, judicial scrutiny of eminent
domain actions has remained deferential, with courts asking only whether the
government is taking the property for “public use” and whether the landowner is
receiving “just compensation,” according to Fifth Amendment constraints. One of
the reasons supporting this deference is that government planning efforts have
precipitated the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment purposes.241 In
both Berman v. Parker 242 and Kelo v. City of New London, 243 economic
redevelopment was found to constitute a “public use” that satisfied the requirement
for the exercise of eminent domain.244 Integrated planning for the redevelopment of
swaths of blighted property played a significant role in both cases as the Court relied
on the comprehensive planning process to find that use of eminent domain was
constitutional.245
In the Kelo case, Suzette Kelo’s property was taken by the local municipality
for purposes of land assembly for redevelopment, even though a local Italian club
240
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was spared from condemnation, and a nonblighted neighborhood was demolished
without ever being replaced by the originally proposed private development.246 A
group of law professors submitted an amicus brief in the Kelo v. City of New London
case, arguing that the use of eminent domain should require a higher level of judicial
scrutiny, similar to the scrutiny applied to land-use exactions under the
Nollan/Dolan standard.247 However, the Court in Kelo followed precedent from the
Berman and Midkiff decisions to find that so long as the government had any rational
basis for exercising its eminent domain power to achieve any conceivable public
purpose, the means to obtain the ends would not be subject to judicial scrutiny.248
While Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, agreed that eminent domain did
not require heightened scrutiny, he did “not foreclose the possibility that a more
stringent standard of review . . . might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn
category of takings.”249
Since Kelo, some state courts have relied upon the existence of a
comprehensive planning process, or the lack thereof, to determine the level of
judicial scrutiny applied to eminent domain action challenges.250 A lack of planning
may be considered “a constitutional red flag”251 that compels courts to more closely
scrutinize individualized condemnation actions. However, unlike other land-use
regulation and decision-making that affects individual landowners, eminent domain
actions do not generally trigger increased judicial scrutiny to prevent governmental
abuse. The Court has chosen not to require heightened scrutiny in eminent domain
actions, particularly if they are the result of comprehensive planning, even though it
requires Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to be applied to land-use exactions.252 Perhaps the
level of judicial scrutiny should depend upon the presence of comprehensive
planning, similar to the deference given to spot zoning when it is in conformance to
a comprehensive plan. This would allow both state and federal courts to provide
more stringent review of those eminent domain actions that appear to unfairly target
individual landowners without the support of a community-wide plan that provides
for shared burdens.253
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F. Constitutional Challenges to Land-Use Regulation
The level of scrutiny applied to judicial review of constitutional challenges to
land-use actions is also at times dependent upon whether the challenged action is
legislative or administrative in nature. For example, “facial” challenges are typically
asserted against legislation that is unconstitutional as applied to everyone, while “as
applied” challenges are asserted to challenge legislative action as it affects an
individual landowner. In the Ninth Circuit, facial challenges applying Nollan and
Dolan are prohibited because the fact-specific inquiry into whether an exaction
meets the test of having a nexus to the impact on the land and being roughly
proportional to the impact requires that the court have some action upon which to
base its analysis.254 In Koontz Coalition v. City of Seattle, the district court reviewed
a land-use challenge asserted by a group of downtown Seattle property owners
against an ordinance implementing a “downtown bonus program.”255 The ordinance
allowed a developer who wished to exceed the allowed building density to either
provide affordable housing or pay a “fee in-lieu” of the housing. 256 This bonus
incentive program did not require developers to provide affordable housing or pay
the in-lieu fees unless they wanted to exceed the established zoning regulations.257
The court held that the property owners’ two Nollan/Dolan claims were not ready
for adjudication because the facial challenge was prudentially unripe under Ninth
Circuit jurisprudence and the future as-applied challenges were speculative and
uncertain.258
Substantive due process and equal protection challenges do not usually
distinguish between generalized legislation and individualized action as the claims
involve an assertion by the landowner that they have been treated unfairly or
differently than similarly situated landowners would be treated. State judicial
scrutiny standards for these challenges vary between a searching review, which
balances the hardships to the landowners against the benefits to the community,259
and a deferential review, which supports a government action if it is fairly debatable
that there is any basis for exercise of the police power. 260 Federal courts are
distinguishing Kelo in several respects, including that “there is no evidence of an overall
economic development or urban revitalization plan into which this taking fits”).
254
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deferential to state and local government and apply a “shocks the conscience”
standard before they will invalidate legislation or an action based on substantive due
process and, perhaps, equal protection claims.261 Procedural due process challenges
are usually not applicable to legislative action, based on the public notice and
hearing requirements for the legislative process. However, administrative actions
require notice and hearing for the specific individual affected and procedural due
process challenges can be raised.
Land-use regulations that burden a fundamental constitutional right may be
subject to heightened scrutiny, not only because they burden property, but because
they burden a protected constitutional right.262 First Amendment challenges to landuse regulation are typically advanced by adult businesses and religious
institutions. 263 Adult businesses claiming that regulating the operations of adult
bookstores, movie theaters, and nude dancing has restricted free speech will receive
strict judicial scrutiny when the restriction is content based rather than content
neutral.264 In order for the court to apply a “strict scrutiny” standard to the regulation,
the adult business must show that its speech is being restricted because of its adult
content. Although local legislation has targeted adult movie theaters because of the
content of the films being shown, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied an
“intermediate scrutiny” review standard to adult business challenges based on the
concept of “secondary effects.” 265 The Court has decided that if the adverse
secondary effects of the adult business, such as increased crime, prostitution, and
other public nuisances, are the target of such local action, not the content of the
speech, judicial review will be based on the less-searching “content-neutral”
standard, rather than the “strict scrutiny” standard.266
The Court’s free speech framework for analyzing challenges against adult
businesses was recently employed by the First Circuit in Showtime Entertainment,
LLC v. Town of Mendon 267 to review zoning restrictions on adult entertainment
businesses in Mendon, Massachusetts. The court found that the bylaws regulating
the size and height of adult business facilities, as well as the operating hours, which
were not applied to other similar businesses, “unconstitutionally infringe[d] on
Showtime’s right to engage in a protected expressive activity.”268 In deciding the
appropriate level of judicial review to apply to these restrictions, the Showtime court
261
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discussed the content-based restriction, which requires the government to prove a
compelling state interest using least restrictive means to achieve that interest, and
the content-neutral restriction, which incidentally burdens speech and requires there
to be a significant government interest that does not burden more speech than
necessary and leaves open alternative channels of communication.269 However, the
court also recognized that the zoning regulation will be treated as content neutral
“only if the differential treatment does not stem from a disapproval of the former
business-type’s expression.” 270 The Showtime court found that Mendon’s zoning
bylaws were underinclusive because they were not applied to other commercial
businesses with similar traffic safety and rural aesthetic secondary effects. 271
Therefore, Mendon did not prove that “it ha[d] a substantial interest in regulating
the secondary effects of adult-entertainment businesses that [was] actually furthered
by its bylaws.”272
Government restrictions on religious exercise may occur in the land-use context
when local officials impose regulations on religious institutions to address concerns
such as traffic, parking, noise, congestion, and other impacts on residential
neighborhoods. In order to evaluate the constitutionality of such government
restrictions on religious exercise, both the legislative branch and judicial branch of
the federal government have been involved in establishing the appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny over such actions. In Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,273 two workers were denied unemployment benefits
when they were discharged from their jobs as drug counselors for smoking peyote
as part of a religious ceremony.274 The Supreme Court stated that it has “consistently
held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).’”275 Therefore, neutral laws of general application that happen to impact
religious freedom should be analyzed under a rational basis test that is highly
deferential to the government. The Court in Smith distinguished some of its earlier
decisions, which had applied a higher level of judicial scrutiny to free exercise
challenges, based on the Sherbert test, which “was developed in a context that lent
itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct.”276 The Smith decision was subsequently revisited by statute, 277 but has
269

Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
271
Id. at 73.
272
Id. at 78.
273
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
274
Id. at 874.
275
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
276
Id. at 884 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401–403 (1963) (holding that
government actions that substantially burden religious exercise must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest)).
277
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014).
270

144

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

been cited to support heightened scrutiny of individualized actions infringing
religious freedom as opposed to generally applicable laws.278 Thus, we see once
more that individualized actions may be subject to increased scrutiny under the First
Amendment, even though generally applicable legislation burdening religious
exercise may be subject only to rational basis review in circumstances where the
Smith decision is still applicable.279
The Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. applied the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) to regulations imposing healthinsurance coverage for contraceptive methods that violate the religious beliefs of
owners of closely held corporations and held that the regulations violated RFRA.280
The Court described the history of its pre-Smith decisions, the Smith decision, and
the two federal statutes enacted following the Smith decision that have attempted to
provide protection for religious liberty.281 The Hobby Lobby Court explained that
following the Smith decision, Congress enacted RFRA to “restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder. . . and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.”282 RFRA was designed to overrule the Smith decision and restore the law
as established by the pre-Smith decisions.283 Originally applied to both the federal
government and to the states, the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores,284 held that
RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states because Congress overstepped
its Section 5 authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the First
Amendment. 285 Congress responded by enacting the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), which “imposes the same
general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental actions.”286
The Hobby Lobby Court noted that, relevant for purposes of deciding this health care
regulation case, RLUIPA amended RFRA’s definition of “exercise of religion” to
separate it from First Amendment case law and to mandate that the concept “be
construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise.”287
RLUIPA has been applied to land-use regulation at the state level, although the
Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson 288 upheld its constitutionality only in regards to its
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application to institutionalized persons. 289 Most lower courts reviewing
constitutional challenges to the land-use portion of the Act have upheld RLUIPA’s
constitutionality as applied to land-use regulation and religious exercise. 290 The
important thing about RLUIPA for purposes of this Article is that RLUIPA is not
typically triggered by a neutral and generally applicable zoning law, but instead
applies when the government is involved in making “individualized assessments of
the proposed uses for the property involved.”291 The RLUIPA substantial burden
provision provides that the government cannot impose a land-use regulation that
substantially burdens religious exercise unless it shows that it furthers a compelling
government interest by the least restrictive means. 292 Decisions applying this
substantial burden provision have recognized that it addresses “‘subtle forms of
discrimination’ by land use authorities that may occur when ‘a state delegates
essentially standardless discretion to nonprofessionals operating without procedural
safeguards.’”293
RLUIPA’s focus on individualized actions that present the opportunity for
arbitrary and discriminatory response by local officials was addressed by the Second
Circuit in Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District
Commission. 294 In Chabad Lubavitch, Chabad purchased property in a historic
district for purposes of expanding the existing building to accommodate its religious
mission. 295 Chabad applied to the Historic District Commission (“HDC”) for
permission to modify the property and was denied. 296 The court found that
Connecticut’s statutory scheme for historic properties regulation requires an
individual assessment of any application to modify such properties and also
“requires that local commissions implement that general rule by applying loosely
defined and subjective standards to discrete applications.”297 The denial of Chabad’s
application to the HDC was determined to be an individualized assessment that
triggered RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision.298 In remanding the claim to the
district court, the Second Circuit instructed the court to consider:
[W]hether the conditions attendant to the HDC’s denial of the Chabad’s
application themselves imposed a substantial burden on the Chabad’s
religious exercise, whether feasible alternatives existed for the Chabad to
exercise its faith, and whether the Chabad reasonably believed it would be
289
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permitted to undertake its proposed modifications when it purchased the
property . . . .299
In addition to requiring heightened scrutiny of individualized actions interfering
with religious exercise, RLUIPA also provides for equal terms claims, which
address unequal, but not different treatment of land-use, 300 and discrimination
claims, which require evidence of discriminatory intent.301
III. ADDRESSING THE KOONTZ CONTROVERSY
This Part addresses the takings issue evoked by in-lieu monetary exactions. The
Court in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District submitted such fees
to the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test. However, the holding left the
unanswered question of how broadly this heightened scrutiny should be applied to
other monetary obligations imposed by the government. Lower courts have applied
varying levels of scrutiny to impact fees, and this Part addresses the multiplicity of
views among the states.
A. Background
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 302 a landowner
seeking to develop a tract of land near Orlando, Florida, was denied permission to
build when he refused to comply with the water district’s mitigation demand to pay
for improvements on land owned by the water district that was located several miles
away in order to offset the environmental impact of his proposed development.303
The water district required this in-lieu exaction, in addition to the physical exaction
requiring the landowner to deed an eleven-acre conservation easement to mitigate
construction on wetlands. 304 The landowner sued the water district for monetary
damages, claiming that the excessive mitigation demands constituted a taking
without just compensation.305
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision that was in favor
of the landowner, holding that the Nollan/Dolan exactions test should not be applied
to the offsite mitigation proposed by the water district, which did not require Koontz
to dedicate real property and that “because St. Johns did not issue permits, Mr.
Koontz never expended any funds towards the performance of offsite mitigation,
and nothing was ever taken from Mr. Koontz.” 306 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
299
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finding that under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine governmental demands
that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the impacts of a proposed
development are subject to a takings claim for just compensation regardless of
whether the permit is approved on the condition that the landowner meets the
demands or whether the permit is denied because the landowner refuses. 307 In
addition, the Court held that monetary exactions “must satisfy the nexus and rough
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.” 308 One of the questions that
remains after the Koontz decision is how far does this scrutiny of land-use
determinations extend?309
Justice Alito, in delivering the opinion of the Court, which held that monetary
exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, noted that its decisions in these cases
“reflect two realities of the permitting process.” 310 The first reality is that the
government “has broad discretion to deny a permit” and coerce a land-use applicant
into giving up property in response to an extortionate demand so long as “the
building permit is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope
to receive.” 311 Such abuse is prohibited by the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.312 The second reality is that new development may impose costs on the
public that should be internalized by landowners, but the government “may not
leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack
an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”313 Applying Nollan
and Dolan to these two permitting realities allows the government “to insist that
applicants bear the full costs of their proposals while still forbidding the government
from engaging in ‘out-and-out . . . extortion.’” 314 Extending this precedent to
monetary exactions, which serve the same function as physical exactions, will
preclude the government from evading the Nollan and Dolan restrictions by giving
the landowner “a choice of either surrendering an easement or making a payment
equal to the easement’s value.”315
The Koontz majority rejected the government’s argument that based on the
concurrence and dissent in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 316 a demand that the
landowner spend money to improve public land does not constitute a taking so long
as the financial obligation does not “‘operate upon or alter an identified property
307
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interest.’”317 This appears to be the major stumbling block for reconciling Justice
Alito’s opinion with Justice Kagan’s dissent, which maintained that “requiring a
person to pay money to the government, or spend money on its behalf” was not a
taking based on the Court’s decision in Eastern Enterprises because requiring
someone to pay money to repair public wetlands “does not affect a ‘specific and
identified propert[y] or property right[]’; it simply ‘imposes an obligation to perform
an act’ (the improvement of wetlands) that costs money.”318 Justice Alito asserted
that the “fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link between the government’s
demand and a specific parcel of real property,”319 while Justice Kagan equated the
government’s requirement that Koontz pay money to restore public wetlands in
exchange for a permit to “‘an ordinary liability to pay money,’” which would not be
a taking according to the majority of Justices in Eastern Enterprises.320 The two
opinions could be reconciled by applying the Koontz majority opinion to monetary
exactions that are imposed as part of a permitting process, with the associated
concerns about broad government discretion and extortion, and applying the
dissent’s reasoning to financial obligations that are legislatively established in the
form of impact fee schedules and, therefore, unrelated to a specific identified
property interest.
On remand, the Florida District Court of Appeal addressed the case for the fifth
time in St. Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz,321 and found that its
decision in Koontz IV “is entirely consistent with the decision of the United States
Supreme Court” and reaffirmed its earlier decision in its entirety without allowing
the briefing to be reopened.322 The dissent objected to the majority’s decision to
affirm the judgment without further review, noting that the Supreme Court in Koontz
held that “the District did not commit a ‘taking without just compensation,’”323 and
thus the Florida court’s affirmation of Koontz IV on the basis of a takings claim is
incorrect because the remand was for the purposes of determining whether Koontz
has a damages remedy (other than a takings remedy) under Florida law.324
B. In-Lieu Exactions and Nollan/Dolan
Turning now to the Koontz Court’s holding that monetary in-lieu exactions are
subject to the Nollan/Dolan test, this Article agrees with the Court’s holding, but
submits that impact fees imposed based on legislatively determined fee schedules
do not constitute monetary exactions. The differing level of scrutiny for legislative
317
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actions (rational basis with no record needed to support reasoning) as opposed to
administrative actions (substantial evidence required) is just one illustration of the
land-use framework that requires individualized governmental decision making to
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny. Justice Arabian’s opinion in the
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City325 decision is helpful in this regard. In Ehrlich, the
landowner challenged both a monetary exaction to mitigate the loss of commercial
recreational use and an “art in public places” impact fee.326 The court distinguished
between a monetary exaction (held in Ehrlich to be subject to Nollan/Dolan) and an
impact fee.327
Nevertheless, we agree with the city that the art in public places fee
is not a development exaction of the kind subject to the Nollan-Dolan
takings analysis. As both the trial court and the Court of Appeal concluded,
the requirement to provide either art or a cash equivalent thereof is more
akin to traditional land use regulations imposing minimal building
setbacks, parking and lighting conditions, landscaping requirements, and
other design conditions such as color schemes, building materials and
architectural amenities. Such aesthetic conditions have long been held to
be valid exercises of the city’s traditional police power, and do not amount
to a taking merely because they might incidentally restrict a use, diminish
the value, or impose a cost in connection with the property. (See, e.g.,
Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 fn.13, 101 S.Ct 2882,
2892 fn. 13, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 [approving prohibition against outdoor
advertising]; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 98 S.Ct. 2646 [upholding municipal power to preserve landmark
structures]; Agins v. City of Tiburon, [] 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138
[upholding condition to preserve scenic views].) The requirement of
providing art in an area of the project reasonably accessible to the public
is, like other design and landscaping requirements, a kind of aesthetic
control well within the authority of the city to impose.328
Exactions, either physical or monetary in lieu, should be subjected to
Nollan/Dolan if they are government conditions targeted to a specific property as
part of the permitting process.329 This could potentially include legislative impact
fees, but only if it can be shown that a specific property or landowner was targeted
by the legislative action. In such a case, this Article proposes that courts reviewing
325
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a landowner’s challenge to a legislatively targeted impact fee use the same concepts
applied in spot zoning cases to ferret out government abuse. Spot zoning challenges
seek a higher level of judicial scrutiny for the legislative act of zoning, as discussed
in Part II.B. above. Factors such as the size of the parcel, the number of landowners
affected, and conformity with the general plan are considered in deciding whether
the zoning is an abuse of power. If examining these same factors in challenges to
impact fees indicates the potential for abuse, Nollan/Dolan judicial scrutiny of a
legislative impact fee would be warranted to prevent the abuse of local power. If
instead the fee has been legislatively determined and appears to be based upon an
analysis of general development impacts, then the concern about either favoritism
or unfairness should not be as strong. The remainder of this Article assumes that
legislative impact fees are not targeted to individual landowners and should not be
subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny unless they appear to be abusive, similar to a charge
of illegal spot zoning.
Individualized government mitigation conditions with the potential to unfairly
affect a specific landowner should be analyzed under Nollan/Dolan, whether they
are physical or monetary, whereas impact fees that are applied to all similarly
situated landowners, based upon previous legislative determinations, should be
subject to a dual rational nexus test or other state review standards, depending on
the state’s law.330 Many state courts, including those in Florida, do apply more than
deferential scrutiny to legislative fees using the dual rational nexus test to make sure
they are related to the impact of a particular type of development and are not being
used in lieu of assessing a tax.331 Impact fees that fail a dual rational nexus test (or
some other state-determined scrutiny) may be considered an invalid tax. Since local
governments may not have the authority to impose taxes under certain
circumstances, impact fees that are not rationally related to the adverse impact
caused by the development may be viewed as revenue raising and presumed to be a
tax. Given that an overarching concern in land use is that local government power
must be constrained because it is subject to abuse, a majority of states have
appropriately distinguished individualized exactions from legislatively imposed
impact fees.332
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C. Impact Fees and the Dual Rational Nexus Test
Local governments have used exactions in some form for more than a century,
beginning with physical exactions that were demanded within a proposed land
development project.333 After World War II, municipalities began asking for “in lieu
of” cash payments instead of land dedication.334 These monetary exactions were the
precursor to impact fees, which are now used to finance community infrastructure
improvements that are required to support the growth generated by land
development. In holding that in-lieu exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny,
the Koontz majority pointed out that land-use officials should not be allowed to avoid
scrutiny by giving the landowner “a choice of either surrendering an easement or
making a payment equal to the easement’s value.”335 Justice Alito noted that “[s]uch
so-called ‘in lieu of’ fees are utterly commonplace . . . and they are functionally
equivalent to other types of land use exactions.”336 Justice Alito cited a law review
article as support for this information, but did not discuss the article’s analysis of the
difference between impact fees, exactions, and how states have applied
Nollan/Dolan to exactions, but have applied state standards to impact fees. 337
Professor Rosenberg’s comprehensive article, The Changing Culture of American
Land Use: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, notes that “the Nollan/Dolan
principles did not override and dominate a well-developed body of state statutory
and constitutional law, and federal litigation did not become the crucible for
determining the legality of impact fee practices.”338
A majority of states have historically applied some version of a dual rational
nexus test to evaluate impact fees and verify their validity. 339 This test was
developed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 340 which challenged the validity of an ordinance imposing a set fee per
developed lot, in lieu of dedicating land. 341 The test was later adopted by other
333
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jurisdictions and has been described with two steps: 1) there must be a rational nexus
“‘between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population
generated by the subdivision’” and 2) a rational nexus “‘between the expenditures
of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.’”342 Scrutiny is
applied to determine whether the fee is being used as a general revenue-raising
regulation and should be classified as a tax. An impact fee that fails the dual rational
nexus test because it appears to be general revenue-raising legislation, not
reasonably related to the adverse impacts created by the development, may be treated
as a tax.343 The tax may then be invalidated if the local government does not have
the power to tax or if the imposition of new taxes requires approval by a super
majority of voters.344
Other states have applied differing levels of scrutiny to impact fees. For
example, in Homebuilders Ass’n of Metropolitan Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park &
Recreation District,345 an Oregon appellate court noted that under Oregon law, a
legislatively imposed exaction of money that is applicable generally to a large
number of people cannot be challenged as a taking. 346 Developers in this case
challenged a system development charge (“SDC”) that charged fees to new
developments for funding parks and recreation facilities.347 The court concluded, as
it had done in an earlier case involving traffic impact fees, that the Nollan/Dolan test
does not apply to legislatively imposed fees calculated by a formula based on the
impact that the development will have on infrastructure. 348 Instead, the court
reviewed various federal and state decisions involving legislative fees and noted that
some jurisdictions applied a “reasonable relationship” test that is “only slightly more
rigorous than the ‘rational basis’ test.”349 The court declined to decide between these
two tests as it concluded that the SDC would easily pass either test.350
Similar to Oregon courts, Arizona courts declined to apply the Nollan/Dolan
test to impact fees. In Home Builders Ass’n of Central Arizona v. City of
Scottsdale, 351 the Arizona Supreme Court examined cases that applied the “dual
nexus test” to uphold development fees imposed to finance public improvements
342
Id. at 226 (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 606, 611–12 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the second prong of the test will not be satisfied unless “the
ordinance . . . specifically earmark[s] the funds collected for use in acquiring capital facilities
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that would be needed in the foreseeable, albeit not immediate, future.352 In resolving
a challenge by developers to a water resources development fee, the court declined
to apply the Nollan/Dolan test because Dolan “involved a city’s adjudicative
decision to impose a condition tailored to the particular circumstances of an
individual case . . . [while] the Scottsdale case involve[d] a generally applicable
legislative decision by the city.”353 Because the court observed that nothing in its
opinions required it “to plunge into the thicket of the levels of scrutiny in this
case,” 354 the court equated the Dolan standard of rough proportionality with the
Arizona statutory requirement that the fee “bear a reasonable relationship ‘to the
community burden.’”355 It held that Scottsdale’s fee meets the state standard, which
requires that a municipality intends, in good faith, to use legislative development
fees to provide additional public services, as required by the new development,
within a reasonable time.356
Courts in Georgia have also declined to apply Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to impact
fees. Tree protection fees were challenged in the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision
in Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n v. DeKalb County.357 The court concluded
that the Tree Ordinance applied uniformly to all property in the county and regulated
the building and development permits that disturb land and affect tree coverage.358
In analyzing the “facial” challenge to the Tree Ordinance as a taking requiring
compensation, the court refused to undertake an analysis under Dolan because
Dolan involved an “as-applied” challenge whereas “this case involve[d] a facial
challenge to a generally applicable land-use regulation.” 359 Additionally, the
Georgia court noted that in Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,360 it
had refused to apply Dolan to legislative determinations. 361 The two dissenting
justices in DeKalb, who also dissented in Parking Ass’n of Georgia,362 objected to
the majority’s efforts to uphold the ordinance, claiming that the Tree Ordinance
“results in a taking of property without compensation.” The DeKalb dissenters
pointed out that Justice Thomas, joined by Justice O’Connor, dissented to the denial
352

Id. at 998 (noting that “[i]n none of these cases was the benefit to the developer
limited to concrete plans for specific developments”).
353
Id. at 1000 (emphasis added) (noting that the question has not been settled by the
Supreme Court and citing Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga.
1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
354
Id.
355
Id. at 998 (citing A.R.S. § 9-463.05).
356
Id.
357
588 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. 2003).
358
Id. at 696.
359
Id. at 697.
360
450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994).
361
588 S.E.2d at 697 (citing Parking Ass’n. of Ga., 450 S.E.2d at 203 n.3).
362
450 S.E.2d at 204 (Sears, J., dissenting) (advocating that a “benefit-extraction”
analysis be applied to the ordinance using the two requirements from the Nollan/Dolan
decisions).

154

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of Georgia based on the lack of distinction between
legislative and administrative acts.363 The DeKalb dissent also noted that there has
not been a consensus in the courts on the issue of whether Dolan applies to
legislative determinations, but that the two Supreme Court Justices in Parking Ass’n
of Georgia “make a compelling case that Dolan applies beyond strictly adjudicatory
decisions.”364
Colorado does not apply the Nollan/Dolan takings analysis to legislatively
enacted fees that are reasonably related to the impact caused by the development.
For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District,365 the Colorado Supreme
Court reviewed a takings challenge by developers to a plant investment fee
(“PIF”).366 The fee was assessed on all building projects for purposes of providing
wastewater services, as subject to state and federal regulations, in the face of impacts
on water quality and quantity from human activity.367 An expert report was prepared
and concluded that the PIF assessed against the Krupps’ project was “not excessive
in relation to the projected impact” of the project and did, in fact, undercharge the
Krupps for certain units. 368 Indeed, some scholars have observed that as
municipalities are required to subject exactions to the Nollan/Dolan test, these
municipalities have discovered that they have been exacting less than what the
impact analysis would support.369 However, the PIF at issue in Krupp was not an
exaction because “the District has no statutory or regulatory authority to deny or
condition the issuance of building permits, and therefore, could not leverage or
extort fees under threat of denying the permit.”370 The court held that the PIF was
not subject to the Nollan/Dolan takings analysis and that it was a “valid, legislatively
established fee that is reasonably related to the District’s interest in expanding its
infrastructure to account for new development.”371
In contrast to those states refusing to apply Nollan/Dolan to impact fees, the
Ohio Supreme Court in Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City
of Beavercreek,372 identified the test to be applied as “whether the fee is in proportion
to the developer’s share of the city’s costs to construct and maintain roadways that
363
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1117–18 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that “[t]he
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will be used by the general public.”373 The court equated the Nollan/Dolan test to a
dual rational nexus test and eschewed both the more lenient “reasonable
relationship” test from California and the stricter “specific and uniquely attributable”
test from Illinois.374 It concluded that the traffic development fees “were reasonable
and that a reasonable relationship existed between the fee paid and the benefits
accruing to developers,”375 which satisfied the test.376 Unfortunately, it appears that
the court conflated the federal standard adopted for exactions in Nollan/Dolan and
the original state standards used for exactions and labeled the test as the “dual
rational nexus test” which was traditionally applied only to impact fees. Indeed, the
Court in Dolan discussed the three general approaches used by states to evaluate
exactions as: 1) the “very generalized statements as to the necessary connection
between the required dedication and the proposed development” resulting in a lax
standard of review; 2) the “‘specifi[c] and uniquely attributable’ test” from Illinois,
which is too exacting; and 3) the reasonable relationship, or intermediate scrutiny
test.377 These state tests for exactions are different from the dual rational nexus tests
applied to impact fees in several states, as discussed above.
The Supreme Court of Illinois also applied Dolan scrutiny to transportation
impact fees in Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass’n v. County of DuPage.378 The
court did not distinguish between exactions and impact fees and applied the standard
from Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect,379 which was developed to
evaluate the constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment and Illinois law of a
requirement that a land developer dedicate 6.7 acres of land for an elementary school
site and playground.380 Shortly thereafter, an Illinois appellate court in Amoco Oil
Co. v. Village of Schaumburg,381 held that challenges against exactions under federal
law would be governed by the less restrictive “rough proportionality” standard from
Dolan, but noted that state court challenges would still be evaluated under the stricter
Pioneer Trust standard.382 The Illinois appellate court also expressed its agreement
with Justice Thomas’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,383 in which the Justice declared that there is no valid
373
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tax, were only unconstitutional if they were “unduly burdensome in application”).
376
Id. at 355–56 (citing Associated Home Builders of Greater E. Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mt. Prospect,
176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961)).
377
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389–91 (adopting the reasonable relationship
test for exactions from the majority of states and renaming it “rough proportionality” to avoid
confusion with the laxer rational basis standard).
378
649 N.E.2d 384, 388–89 (Ill. 1995).
379
176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961).
380
649 N.E. 2d at 389–91 (citing 176 N.E.2d 799 at 800–02).
381
661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
382
Id. at 387 n.5.
383
515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
374
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constitutional “distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized
administrative takings.”384 The Illinois court then noted that even if there were such
a distinction, it would nevertheless apply the Dolan test to both legislative and
adjudicative actions.385
While some states have judicially determined the level of scrutiny applied to
impact fees, others have statutorily defined and limited the use of impact fees.
Hawaii, for example, legislatively defines impact fees and limits the use of these
fees to situations where the fees collected are used to fund the improvements
required by the development.386 The public facilities to be benefitted by the fees are
identified through a needs assessment study for either future or existing
improvements.387 The developer is then required to pay a pro rata share of the cost,
which must be proportional to improvements, and the impact fee must be “fair and
reasonable.”388 To determine whether the impact fee assessed is proportional to the
cost of improvements, the statute requires that seven factors be considered to ensure
that the developer is not charged for more than his or her relative share of the
community’s increased burden. 389 These detailed factors look to the additional
demands placed on public facilities by the development, the availability of other
funding for capital improvements, the extent to which the developer has previously
paid impact fees without direct benefit, etc.390 In addition, the Hawaii code requires
that impact fees collected be placed in a separate account; that impact fees be
collected and expended in the same geographic zone that will benefit the new
development; that the fees be related directly to the necessary improvements; that
the fees be spent on the type of facilities for which they were collected; and that the
fees be spent within six years of collection or else refunded to the developer with
interest.391
Washington has also adopted a statute to govern impact fees, and in City of
Olympia v. Drebick,392 the Washington Supreme Court was called upon to determine
the validity of a transportation impact fee.393 It applied the state statutory framework
for impact fees, which is similar to the Hawaii legislation.394 In Washington, the
384

661 N.E.2d at 390 (citing 515 U.S. at 1118).
Amoco Oil Co., 661 N.E.2d at 390.
386
DAVID L. CALLIES, REGULATING PARADISE: LAND USE CONTROLS IN HAWAI’I 96
(2d ed. 2010).
387
Id. at 96–97.
388
Id. at 97.
389
Id. (referring to HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d) (2014)).
390
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d) (2014).
391
CALLIES, supra note 386, at 97 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-144). It should be
noted that Professor Callies in early 2015 pointed out that to the best of his knowledge,
“Hawai’i’s impact fee statute has never been used by any of our four counties.” E-mail from
David L. Callies, Professor of Law, Univ. of Haw., to author (Jan. 5, 2015) (on file with
author).
392
126 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2006).
393
Id. at 802.
394
Id. at 804–06 (describing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.02.050–.090 of the Land Use
Petition Act).
385
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impact fee statute authorizes local governments to impose fees on development
activity in order to finance system improvements required to support new
development.395 These impact fees
(a) [s]hall only be imposed for system improvements that are reasonably
related to the new development;
(b) [s]hall not exceed a proportionate share of the costs of system
improvements that are reasonably related to the new development; and
(c) [s]hall be used for system improvements that will reasonably benefit
the new development.396
Like the Hawaii legislation, the local government has a six-year period in which
to spend the impact fees “‘on public facilities intended to benefit the development
activity for which the impact fees were paid.’” 397 The Drebick court upheld the
impact fee, distinguishing between impact fees and land dedications and refusing to
apply the Nollan/Dolan test, as neither Nollan nor Dolan involved impact fees and
instead concerned a requirement that the property owner dedicate a portion of their
land for public use.398
These state court examples illustrate the variety of approaches used to
scrutinize monetary fees that are legislatively enacted.399 The level of judicial review
over these impact fees ranges from the standard rational basis review applied to
legislative actions; the Nollan/Dolan standard applied to exactions; the dual rational
nexus test for impact fees, which requires the government to show that the impact
fee does not exceed the costs attributable to the development and that the developer
will receive a benefit from the infrastructure; and the more stringent “specific and
uniquely attributable” standard from Pioneer Trust. 400 This Article proposes that
applying a judicial dual rational nexus test, or a similar state statute as found in
Hawaii and Washington, will afford municipalities greater flexibility by deferring to
legislative judgments about how to reasonably allocate development externalities,
while deterring the abuse of power by using a sufficient level of judicial scrutiny to
distinguish valid impact fees from invalid taxes.401
395

Id. at 804–05.
Id. at 805 (emphasis in original) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050(3)).
397
Id. at 806 (emphasis in original) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.080(1)).
398
Id. at 807–09.
399
See also B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Utah 2006)
(noting that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to both legislative and adjudicative impact fees
and finding “that the legislature intended to apply the rough proportionality test to all
exactions, irrespective of their source”).
400
See generally Garnett, supra note 369, at 967 (discussing the evolution of the
standards applied to regulatory takings).
401
See Lawrence Friedman & Eric W. Wodlinger, Municipal Impact Fees in
Massachusetts, 88 MASS. L. REV. 131, 137 (2004) (recommending that Massachusetts courts
apply a dual rational nexus analysis to impact fees).
396
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D. Impact Fees as Taxation
Local government must deal with concerns about “the inadequacy of local
public infrastructure” when faced with continued development in the community.402
Impact fees and taxation are two different financial techniques available to address
these concerns. However, local government “may regulate and impose fees on the
basis of their police power, but they may not impose taxes.”403 If impact fees are
considered taxes, it is because they must be paid by private parties to government
agencies regardless of whether the private parties get the benefits of whatever
activity is financed by the payments. 404 State legislatures generally limit local
government’s power to tax, but voters who are upset with the taxation can use the
election process to vote local officials out of office.405 However, if the taxes are
applied only to land developers, citizens wishing to prevent growth could keep the
local officials in office and place the burden of the public as a whole to maintain
infrastructure, build schools, provide parks, etc., on the back of developers and
newcomers. This is certainly a scenario intended to be addressed by the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, at least according to the Court in Armstrong v. United
States, 406 which observed that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”407 However, such
a tax on land developers only would violate the basic rule that taxes must be
uniform 408 and, in any event, taxes cannot be considered a Fifth Amendment
taking409 “unless the taxation is so ‘arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it
402

Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 22.
Id. at 218.
404
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 40; see also McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836,
845 (Kan. 1995) (describing the distinction between an impact fee and a tax).
405
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 22.
406
364 U.S. 40 (1960).
407
Id. at 49.
408
See id.
409
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600–01 (2013)
(quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 243 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that “[i]t is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees . . . are not “takings”’”));
Laborde v. City of Gahanna, 561 F. App’x 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district
court’s recognition of the “well-established proposition that a government’s act of taxation
is not a ‘taking’ of private property under the Constitution”); Quarty v. United States, 170
F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1916)); Coleman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is
well established that Congress’s general exercise of its taxing power does not violate the
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on takings without just compensation.”); Maxwell v. United
States, 104 Fed. Cl. 112, 120 (Fed. Cl. 2012) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim
“because the imposition of lawful taxes does not constitute a taking”); Montagne v. United
States, 90 Fed. Cl. 41, 50 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (quoting Skillo v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 734,
403
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was not the exertion of taxation, but a confiscation of property.’”410 In some states,
cities do not have the authority to impose development impact fees as regulatory
fees under their police power.411 If the impact fees operate as taxes, municipalities
may violate state statutes that limit local government’s ability to impose taxes.412
While taxes cannot be considered a taking, there are situations where the
government essentially confiscates property, which can constitute a taking.
Following the Koontz decision, the Seventh Circuit in Cerajeski v. Zoeller,413 found
that Indiana’s retention of interest on Cerajeski’s bank account under an act for
unclaimed property was a taking of property. 414 The court quoted Koontz as
remarking:
[W]e have repeatedly found takings where the government, by
confiscating financial obligations, achieved a result that could have been
obtained by imposing a tax. Most recently, in Brown [v. Legal Foundation
of Washington[] we were unanimous in concluding that a State Supreme
Court’s seizure of the interest on client funds held in escrow was a taking
despite the unquestionable constitutional propriety of a tax that would
have raised exactly the same revenue. Our holding in Brown followed
from . . . two earlier cases in which we treated confiscations of money as
takings despite their functional similarity to a tax.415
According to Professor William Fischel, “economists have not provided
especially helpful guidance about exactions and impact fees” and have treated these
payments as though they were taxes. 416 However, unlike taxes, a landowner can
refuse to pay an exaction or impact fee and decline to receive a development
permit.417 Fischel does not view this bargaining as antidevelopment, but instead sees
exactions as giving landowners relief from the underlying regulations. 418 He
recognizes that the Supreme Court exaction decisions have been embraced by
743 (Fed. Cl. 2005)) (noting that “the lawful exercise of the Government’s collection powers
does not amount to a prohibited Fifth Amendment ‘taking’”).
410
Quarty, 170 F.3d at 969 (quoting Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24); see also Cerajeski v.
Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that Indiana’s retention of interest on
Cerajeski’s bank account under an act for unclaimed property was a taking of property).
411
See, e.g., Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass’n of
Miss., Inc., 932 So. 2d 44, 53–59 (Miss. 2006) (holding that city’s impact fees constitute
illegal taxes).
412
See, e.g., Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., 970 N.E.2d 916, 923–24 (Ohio 2012)
(applying a test that is similar to the dual rational nexus test to find that the impact fees were
taxes in that they raised revenue for the public’s benefit and did not specially benefit those
paying the fees).
413
735 F.3d 577.
414
Id. at 580.
415
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601).
416
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 40.
417
Id. at 41.
418
Id.
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developers who believe they face extortionate demands, but he is also concerned
that these tests are “likely to inhibit ordinary negotiations.”419
IV. EXPANDING THE USE OF IMPACT FEES
The traditional use of impact fees by municipalities to support the infrastructure
needed for new development is changing as local government recognizes the impact
that growth has on other concerns such as affordable housing, climate change, and
environmental resilience and sustainability. Addressing issues such as wetlands
mitigation, coastal changes, water resources, flood plains, and general land
degradation has increasingly been considered a local responsibility. On the forefront
of these issues, local municipalities have attempted to address the critical need for
affordable housing by various financing approaches including mandatory set-asides,
density bonuses, and linkage fees. Linkage fees “specify the benefits developers are
required to provide according to a formula that is uniformly applied to all
developers,” 420 thus avoiding the concern about ad hoc negotiating between
municipalities and developers during the zoning approval process.421
The constitutionality of these approaches to providing affordable housing has
been challenged as a Fifth Amendment Taking without just compensation.
Mandatory set-asides require commercial or residential developers to provide
housing for lower-income groups or contribute funds for public construction of such
housing. 422 Density bonuses from zoning officials are valuable when they
accompany these set-asides in order to incentivize developers to provide affordable
housing when the development creates the need for workforce housing.423 At issue
is whether these inclusionary zoning techniques should be evaluated as exactions
subject to a potential taking under the Nollan/Dolan standard; 424 land-use
regulations subject to substantial deference under the police power; impact fees

419
Id. at 41–45 (concluding that “the Court’s exactions decisions run counter to the
economic idea that takings jurisprudence makes governments face a higher cost for
regulation”).
420
Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Development Impact on Housing
Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1991).
421
Id.
422
David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, URB.
LAW., Fall 2010/Winter 2011, at 307, 308 (citing MANDELKER, supra note 82, at § 9.23).
423
See id. at 323, 328–29.
424
See Andrew W. Schwartz, The Impact of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management Dist. on Inclusionary Housing, 17th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings
Challenges to Land Use and Environmental Regulations, U.C. Davis co-sponsored with
Vermont Law, Sept. 2014 (on file with author) (noting the concern that “[b]ecause few
inclusionary housing requirements are ad hoc, the prognosis for inclusionary housing under
Koontz depends largely on whether courts expand the holding in Koontz to legislative
exactions”).
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subject to state judicial review standards such as the dual rational nexus test; or as
invalid taxes.425
Some states have treated mandatory set-asides as impact fees and have rejected
the plea to apply heightened scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan. For example, in Holmdel
Builders Ass’n v. Township of Holmdel,426 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
mandatory set-asides are similar to development fees in that they perform “an
identical function.”427 Thus, as a form of inclusionary zoning to supply affordable
housing, they are “regulatory measures, not taxes.”428 The California Supreme Court
similarly refused to subject all development fees to heightened scrutiny under
Nollan/Dolan in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco,429 by
“adhering instead to the distinction we drew in Ehrlich . . . between ad hoc exactions
and legislatively mandated, formulaic mitigation fees.”430 The court determined that
the housing replacement fee, required when a landowner converted a residential
hotel to use by tourists or daily renters, was not a tax designed to raise general
revenue, but was instead paid into a special account used to replace the reduced
residential housing as a result of the conversion. 431 While refusing to apply the
Nollan/Dolan test, the court in San Remo Hotel did apply increased scrutiny to the
fee and noted that “[a]s a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, such fees
must bear a reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the
deleterious public impact of the development.”432
California appellate courts have reached different conclusions when
considering similar housing ordinances and have sometimes applied the reasonable
relationship standard under the Mitigation Fee Act or the substantial deference
standard applied to the exercise of police power.433 The California Supreme Court
425
See, e.g., Michael Floryan, Cracking the Foundation: Highlighting and Criticizing
the Shortcomings of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1039,
1062–69 (2010) (noting that as among classifying mandatory set-asides as impact fees, taxes,
rent control, or exactions for purposes of judicial scrutiny, “[t]he fourth, and most suitable,
characterization of mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances is an ‘exaction,’” subject to
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny); Tim Iglesias, Framing Inclusionary Zoning: Exploring the Legality
of Local Inclusionary Zoning and Its Potential to Meet Affordable Housing Needs, ZONING
& PLAN. L. REP., April 2013, at 1, 4, 13 n.22 (noting that inclusionary zoning may be
challenged under different characterizations with “different possible legal tests”).
426
583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990).
427
Id. at 294.
428
Id.
429
41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002).
430
Id. at 105.
431
Id. at 108.
432
Id. at 105.
433
See, e.g., Trinity Park, L.P. v. City of Sunnyvale, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 45 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011) (requiring that developer sell five of the forty-two planned houses below the
market rate is not intended to “defra[y] all or a portion of the cost of public facilities related
to the development project” and therefore “does not constitute an ‘other exaction’” within
the meaning of the Mitigation Fee Act so that the statute of limitations for that Act is not
applicable); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal. v. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63, 72–73
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to apply the Nollan/Dolan test to an affordable housing charge

162

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

in California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose,434 clarified the legal review
standards for affordable housing ordinances by distinguishing housing ordinances
that require developers to offset adverse impacts created by the proposed
development, from housing ordinances that instead restrict a landowner’s use of land
for broad general welfare purposes. 435 Housing ordinance provisions that are
intended to address direct impacts will likely be considered exactions that must meet
the means-end test under Nollan/Dolan or under the Mitigation Fee Act. Housing
ordinances that limit developers in the use of their property for broader purposes
under the police power will be subject to the traditional deferential standard of
rational basis review.
In City of San Jose, the court held that the city’s inclusionary housing
conditions imposed on developments are not exactions subject to review under the
unconstitutional conditions standards of the Takings Clause, but are instead
limitations on the way developers can use their property.436 The city’s ordinance at
issue required residential developments of twenty or more units to set aside fifteen
percent of the units for below-market pricing for low-income households.437 The
court distinguished its decision in San Remo Hotel stating that
[U]nlike the condition that was at issue in San Remo Hotel . . . namely, an
in lieu monetary fee that is imposed to mitigate a particular adverse effect
of the development proposal under consideration—the conditions imposed
by the San Jose ordinance at issue here do not require a developer to pay
a monetary fee but rather place a limit on the way a developer may use its
property.438
The court determined that San Jose’s affordable housing ordinance was not an
exaction, subject to scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan, but was instead a price control that
and applying instead the reasonable relationship requirement, used by the San Remo court,
to find that the housing fee revision was not reasonably justified under the Development
Agreement because it did not pass the mitigation fee test); Action Apartment Ass’n v. City
of Santa Monica, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (refusing to apply
Nollan/Dolan test to a legislative ordinance of general application that required affordable
multifamily house as a condition to development approval); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal.
v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to apply
Nollan/Dolan to the housing fee at issue because it was the result of generally applicable
economic legislation and not ad hoc bargaining).
434
Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied,
2016 WL 763863 (2016).
435
Id. (disapproving Building Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63, to the
extent that it subjected an affordable housing in-lieu fee to a means-end test even though it
was not imposed to mitigate the developer’s impact but was instead imposed to achieve a
broader public purpose).
436
City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974.
437
Id. at 978.
438
Id. at 979.
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would not constitute a taking unless it was determined to be a regulatory taking
under the multifactor test of Penn Central, which the challengers expressly declined
to rely upon.439
The court in City of San Jose also distinguished its opinion in Sterling Park,
L.P. v. City of Palo Alto,440 finding that the San Jose ordinance could not be equated
with the Palo Alto ordinance because the Palo Alto ordinance required the developer
to grant an option to the city to buy the affordable units on the initial sale or resale
of the units while the San Jose ordinance did not contain such a requirement.441 In
Sterling Park, the court applied the statute of limitations from the Mitigation Fee
Act to Palo Alto’s affordable housing requirements by treating them as exactions
instead of land-use restrictions.442 The Mitigation Fee Act was enacted to respond to
developer concerns that local governments were imposing development fees that
were not related to the actual impact the proposed development might have on the
local infrastructure. 443 Thus, the City of San Jose court determined that the
affordable housing ordinance in San Jose was a land-use regulation limiting the
developers’ use of property, while the Palo Alto ordinance was an exaction covered
by the Mitigation Fee Act because it required developers to either pay an in-lieu
exaction or sell units below market rate and grant the city options to purchase.444
The court made clear that its decision in Sterling Park did not establish a “legal
test that applies in evaluating the substantive validity of the affordable housing
requirements imposed by an inclusionary housing ordinance.”445 Instead, the court
explained that
[W]hen a municipality enacts a broad inclusionary housing ordinance to
increase the amount of affordable housing in the community and to
disperse new affordable housing in economically diverse projects
throughout the community, the validity of the ordinance does not depend
upon a showing that the restrictions are reasonably related to the impact of
a particular development to which the ordinance applies. Rather, the
restrictions must be reasonably related to the broad general welfare
purposes for which the ordinance was enacted.446

439

Id. at 991–92.
310 P.3d 925 (Cal. 2013).
441
City of San Jose, 351 P.3d at 1005–06.
442
Sterling Park, 310 P.3d at 934 (“The statute governs conditions on development a
local agency imposes that divest the developer of money or a possessory interest in property,
but not restrictions on the manner in which a developer may use its property.”).
443
See Barratt Am., Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 124 P.3d 719, 720 (Cal. 2005)
(citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436 (Cal. 1996)).
444
City of San Jose, 351 P.3d at 1005–06.
445
Id. at 1006.
446
Id. at 1000.
440
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Drawing upon its decision in Ehrlich, the court distinguished between the
recreational-development fee in that case that was intended to offset the impact of
the proposed development and was therefore subject to the Nollan/Dolan test, and
the public art fee, which constituted general legislation for the public benefit and
was subject to the traditional deference standard.447
Local government attempts to use impact fees and other revenue-raising
techniques, specifically designed to mitigate development impacts on affordable
housing needs, climate change, coastal resources, flood plains, water resources, and
other environmental impacts,448 must be rationally tied to the projected impact of the
project. It is likely that environmental impact assessments will continue to fill this
role when a project potentially presents a significant impact.449 Exactions or impact
fees imposed for the purpose of mitigating future impacts of development may
require an immediate burden on a landowner to address harms such as shore
protection projects anticipated from a future sea level rise.450
Mandatory set-asides and linkage fees supporting inclusionary housing may be
subject to scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan, particularly if the mechanism for
determining such fees involves individualized bargaining between local officials and
developers. 451 But it is more likely that inclusionary housing ordinances will be
legislative in nature and that Koontz should have no impact on such laws unless it is

447

Id. at 1001.
See, e.g., Michael Castle Miller, Note, The New Per Se Takings Rule: Koontz’s
Implicit Revolution of the Regulatory State, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 945–46 (2014) (noting
the concern that requiring coal-fired power plants to install scrubbers to mitigate air pollution
as a condition to receive a building permit could be considered a per se taking after Koontz);
see also Schwartz, supra note 424, at 16–17 (discussing concern “as to whether exactions
that mitigate harm to the users of a new development project from a pre-existing
environmental condition that the new development did not cause would satisfy the
Nollan/Dolan test” and citing a case that will decide a similar issue, California Bldg. Indus.
Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2013), review
granted, California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 312 P.3d 1070
(Cal. 2013)).
449
Ruhl, supra note 22.
450
See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 526–27.
451
See, e.g., Lambert v. City & Cty. of S.F., 529 U.S. 1045, 1049 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (favoring remand for analysis of
Planning Commission’s denial of a permit under Nollan/Dolan after commission sought a
demand for a $600,000 payment and developer offered only $100,000); see Sanjay Bhatt &
Daniel Beekman, Seattle Weighing New Tax on Builders for Affordable Housing, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2024555479_fees
17xml.html [http://perma.cc/A4DC-H22Y]; see also J. Michael Marshall & Mark A.
Rothenberg, An Analysis of Affordable/Work-Force Housing Initiatives and Their Legality
in the State of Florida, Part I, 82-JUN FLA. B.J. 79, 81 (2008) (arguing that “inclusionary
zoning ordinances properly fall within the development exactions category and are subject
to the Nollan/Dolan analysis”). See generally Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides, supra note 422,
at 314–19.
448
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decided that heightened scrutiny should apply to legislative regulations.452 Taxes
may be imposed to spread the responsibility for addressing these impacts to all
members of a community or region, but such taxation actions cannot be challenged
as Fifth Amendment takings.
If local municipalities or counties wish to mitigate development impacts on
climate change and other natural resources, a neutral and generally applicable
legislative scheme that is developed through expert studies will be the best approach
to help prevent government from behaving badly in individualized situations.
Depending upon the state, even these legislatively developed fees may require
judicial scrutiny in the form of the dual rational nexus test, which may have the same
practical effect as heightened judicial scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan. Nollan/Dolan
scrutiny should be reserved for individualized government demands in a permitting
situation when either land or money is exacted to specifically mitigate the proposed
development’s impact. Legislatively determined impact fees should be subject to a
means-ends test, sometimes referred to as the dual rational nexus test, to check for
abuse and verify that fees are not being imposed as taxes. And legislation regulating
the use of land under the police power should be subject to the traditional rational
basis test for deference to the government if the validity of the action is “fairly
debatable.”
V. CONCLUSION
The majority’s decision in Koontz, to submit monetary in-lieu exactions to the
Nollan/Dolan test, fits into the overall regulatory takings structure established by the
Supreme Court since the Pennsylvania Coal decision in 1922. Koontz echoes the
objective developed in Nollan and Dolan to “provide important protection against
the misuse of the power of land-use regulation.”453 This has been a consistent theme
as noted by the Court in Lingle when it repudiated the “substantially advances”
means-ends takings test from Agins.454 The Court retained the Nollan/Dolan test,
even though it was developed from the “substantially advances” prong of Agins,
explaining “that the application of intermediate judicial review in Nollan/Dolan was
appropriate because, as a condition of ad hoc development approval, a local agency
exacted an ad hoc possessory interest in property, tantamount to a physical
taking.”455 The Lingle Court recognized that it is well established that legislative
judgments about the need for regulatory actions and the likely effectiveness of such
actions are entitled to deference.456 Lower court cases decided since Koontz have
generally cited to it for purposes of saying that taxes are not takings and that the
452
See Schwartz, supra note 424, at 22–24 (proposing that “intermediate scrutiny does
not apply to legislative inclusionary housing” by analyzing California cases that have
generally upheld inclusionary housing ordinances against takings challenges).
453
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013).
454
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
455
Schwartz, supra note 424, at 15 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545–48).
456
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
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obligation to pay money, unless tied to a specific property interest, is not a per se
taking. 457 Koontz has also been cited in reference to the application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,458 but has created confusion in cases applying
the Nollan/Dolan framework to evaluate a takings challenge to legislation requiring
the set-aside of raisins459 and legislation requiring property owners to pay a lump
sum amount to displaced tenants to address affordable housing needs.460
Legislatively determined impact or assessment fees, established outside the
land-use permitting context, should not be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny and
should instead be tested under the applicable state law review standard, such as
deferential review, statutory review, or the dual rational nexus test. The dual rational
nexus test focuses on whether 1) there is a rational nexus “‘between the need for
additional capital facilities and the growth in population generated by the
subdivision’” and 2) there is a rational nexus “‘between the expenditures of the funds
collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.’”461 While this test may seem
similar to the Nollan/Dolan test, which requires that there be an essential nexus and
proportionality between the exaction requested and the impact caused by the
development sought, the dual rational nexus test requires that the impact fee does
not exceed the cost of the infrastructure required by the development and that the
development receives a benefit from the infrastructure. If the state has not defined a
heightened review standard for legislative impact fees, the fees should be treated as
any other legislative act and given great deference.462 However, even if the impact
fee passes the state test, landowners can still assert a takings challenge.
Any physical occupation or confiscation of real property, whether based upon
administrative or legislative action should be a per se taking under Loretto unless it
is part of a land-use permitting process. Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny was
developed to address government demands that would otherwise be a per se taking
if made outside the context of land-use permitting. However, because the
government could deny the permit outright, it is allowed instead to condition the
permit on exactions that mitigate the project’s impact so long as the conditions are
not unconstitutional. Therefore, the Nollan/Dolan test should be applied only to
457
See, e.g., Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util., 7 N.E.3d 1045,
1055 (Mass. 2014) (noting that “[o]n the whole, Federal courts have established that an
obligation to pay money is not a per se taking where the obligation does not affect or operate
on a specific, identified property interest”).
458
See, e.g., Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337, 393 (Wisc. 2014)
(quoting Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594) (noting that “[t]he doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions provides that ‘the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he
exercises a constitutional right’”)).
459
See discussion of Horne, supra Section II.A.
460
See discussion of Levin, supra Section II.A.
461
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 226 (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 431
So. 2d 606, 611–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1983) (noting that the second prong of the test will
not be satisfied unless “the ordinance . . . specifically earmark[s] the funds collected for use
in acquiring capital facilities to benefit the new residents”)).
462
See Schwartz, supra note 424, at 25 (suggesting that municipalities conduct a nexus
study to support an inclusionary housing ordinance against potential challenges).
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government actions conditioning the grant of land-use permits on individualized
exactions, either physical or monetary.
The physical occupation or confiscation of personal property through
administrative or legislative action is also considered a per se taking based on a long
line of precedential decisions that precede the Loretto decision. Legislative
regulations of either personal property or real property should not be evaluated under
Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny because regulations are not part of the
individualized land-use permitting process.
Takings challenges may be successful against either legislative or
administrative government actions, if such regulation “goes too far.” However,
unless the context of the challenge is a land-permitting process, such takings
challenges should be analyzed using the Court’s regulatory takings framework,
without the Nollan/Dolan scrutiny needed to address the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. If the government action causes a permanent physical occupation or
confiscation of property, it is a per se taking under Loretto. If the government action
deprives the property owner of all economically viable use, it is a per se taking under
Lucas, unless excepted under state law concepts of property. Finally, if it is not a per
se taking, but instead deprives the property owner of partial economic value, it
should be analyzed under the Penn Central factors by looking at the severity of the
impact on the property value, the interference with the property owner’s investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the government action.
The land-use law framework, developed at both the state and federal levels, is
designed to apply heightened scrutiny to government actions in situations where
there is a potential for the abuse of power. When government officials make
decisions that are tied to a specific landowner in an administrative, rather than
legislative capacity, there is the concern that the landowner is being either unjustly
favored or disfavored. Thus, challenges to these individualized actions will be
subject to greater scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s approach to takings law
appropriately recognizes this potential for abuse in applying the Nollan/Dolan test
to both physical and monetary exactions in the context of land-use permitting.
However, this Article proposes that Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is not appropriate for
generalized legislative actions that impose financial burdens on property owners and
that “in lieu” exactions individually assessed as part of the permitting process should
be distinguished from impact fees applied equally to all developers without regard
to a specific project.
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APPENDIX A: TAKINGS FLOWCHART
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